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Everyone is finally noticing that the current Supreme Court is
changing its jurisprudence on religious freedom. The commentators are

finally paying more attention to the fact that seven of the Court's current Justices were raised Catholic.' What role have Catholics played in
the Supreme Court's history? This article traces their contributions on

religious freedom and civil rights, starting with Chief Justice Taney and
ending with Justice Barrett.
All nine Justices voted unanimously for religious freedom over

LGBTQ rights in Fulton v. Philadelphia.2 In that case, Catholic Social
Services won the argument that they have a religious right to participate
in Philadelphia's foster parent program while discriminating against

same-sex couples when they choose who gets foster children, even
though such LGBTQ discrimination is against Philadelphia law.3 The
religious exemption defeated Philadelphia's anti-discrimination laws
with a unanimous vote.

1. See, e.g., LINDA GREENHOUSE, JUSTICE ON THE BRINK (2021); Ruth Marcus, The Rule
WASHINGTON POST, (Nov. 28, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/11/28/supreme-court-decisions-abortion-guns-religious-freedom-loom/.
2. Fulton v. Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021).
of Six,

3.

Id
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The current Court has also expanded public school teachers' right
to pray,4 given more funding to religious schools,5 and overruled Roe
and Casey,6 the cases that protected women's constitutional right to

abortion.7 The Establishment Clause is weaker now than it was when
Justice Brennan was the only Catholic on the Court.

At stake is what religious freedom means today, as the Justices
intensely debate just what the First Amendment's Religion Clauses
protect. Do religious institutions' members have to obey the law, or do
they get an automatic exemption so that they can do whatever they

want? Many Court cases, especially those about the ministerial exception, give religions the right to disobey all antidiscrimination laws.' Re9
ligion is winning more victories at the Court every year.

Religion has defeated COVID legislation by a closer vote in the
Supreme Court's numerous shadow docket cases about government re-

10
strictions on religious ceremonies to prevent the spread of the virus.
The shadow docket cases do not receive full briefing and oral argument

but are instead decided by the Court without full review."'
It was different at COVID's beginning. In May 2020, the Court
refused an injunction in favor of a church asking for a limitation on

California's anti-COVID policies.' 2 Chief Justice John Roberts joined
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Elena Kagan, and Sonia
Sotomayor in denying the injunction. 13 Justices Clarence Thomas, Neil
Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh dissented. 14 Two months later, the same

4. Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., No. 21-418, 2022 WL 2295034 (U.S. June 27, 2022).
5. Carson as next friend of O. C. v. Makin, 142 S. Ct. 1987 (2022).
6. Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., No. 19-1392, 2022 WL 2276808 at *7 (U.S.
June 24, 2022).
7. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
8. See, e.g., Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020).
9. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, An Extraordinary Winning Streakfor Religion at the Supreme
Court, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/05/us/politics/supremecourt-religion.html.
10. See discussion infra Section V.F.
11. See David Leonhardt, Rulings Without Explanations, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/03/briefing/scotus-shadow-docket-texas-abortion-law.html.
12. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020) (denying application for injunctive relief).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1614 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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Court refused an injunction against Nevada's COVID law.15 Justices
Alito, Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Gorsuch dissented. 16
Then, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg died in September 2020 and
was replaced by Justice Amy Coney Barrett in October 2020.17 That

one vote changed the result of the 5-4 rulings. On the eve of Thanksgiving 2020, Justice Barrett joined the four previous COVID dissenters

and ruled that New York had violated the First Amendment Free Exercise rights of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn and two Orthodox Jewish congregations.1 8 Chief Justice Roberts dissented, as did Justices Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor.1 9 In February 2021, Justices
Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor again dissented from the Court's ruling

in favor of the church's challenge to the state laws. 20 The other six Justices voted for the church, although they disagreed about just how far
the injunction should go.21 In another 2021 case, Justices Thomas,
Alito, Kavanaugh, Gorsuch, and Barrett voted for the religion, while

Chief Justice Roberts rejoined the dissenters, Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. 22 Tandon gave more protection to religions than

to public health laws and suggested a new, more religion-friendly approach to religious freedom.2 3 A Reuters analysis of the shadow docket
confirmed that religious groups were "repeatedly favored" by the
Court. 24

The Court then refused to grant an injunction pausing Maine's

regulation requiring healthcare workers to be vaccinated against

15. Calvary Chapel Dayton valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603 (2020) (denying application
for injunctive relief).
16. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting); Id. at 2609 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); Id. (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting).
17. Barbara Sprunt, Amy Coney Barrett Confirmed to Supreme Court, Takes Constitutional Oath, NPR (Oct. 26, 2020, 8:07 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/10/26/927640619/senate-confirms-amy-coney-barrett-to-the-supreme-court.
18. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) (per curiam).
19. Id. at 75 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 76 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Id. at 78 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
20. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 716, 720 (2021) (granting,
in part, application for injunctive relief) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 716; see also id. at 717 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) ("Deference, though broad,
has its limits.").
22. Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294 (2021) (per curiam).
23. See id. at 1297.
24. See Lawrence Hurley and Andrew Chung, Analysis: U.S. Supreme Court's 'Shadow
Docket' FavoredReligion and Trump, REUTERS (July 28, 2021, 9:30 AM), https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/us-supreme-courts-shadow-docket-favored-religion-trump-202107-28.
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COVID-19. 25 No religious exemptions were allowed by the state. 26 If

the workers are not vaccinated, they lose their jobs. 27 Justices Gorsuch,
Thomas, and Alito dissented.28 They would have granted the injunction, arguing that the law did not satisfy strict scrutiny under the Court's
jurisprudence of Lukumi, Fulton, and Tandon.29 The Justices repeatedly

debate just how much and why religion should be protected, and continue to do so this term.
On the full docket, religious freedom remains in the news in 2022.
The Court decided, 6-3, that a Maine program that allows parents to

receive tuition money to send their children to public or private schools,
but does not pay for religious schools, violates the Free Exercise
Clause. 30 The parents' case was influenced by Espinoza v. Montana
Department of Revenue, where five Supreme Court justices-Chief

Justice Roberts, with Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh-modified the Court's jurisprudence of the First Amendment's Religion Clauses. 31 The First Amendment contains the Free Ex-

ercise Clause and the Establishment Clause.32 The Court ruled that if
private schools get state aid, religious schools must also receive it.3 3
The religious schools have a free-exercise right to such aid. 34 The five
Justices agreed that the Establishment Clause does not block aid to re-

ligious schools. 35
The concurrences added additional arguments. Justices Thomas
and Gorsuch said the Establishment Clause does not apply to the states
who should be free to choose whatever religion they want. 36 Justice
Alito emphasized that the Montana Constitution's no-aid section, like

25. Does 1-3 v. Mills, 142 S. Ct. 17 (2021) (denying application for injunctive relief).
26. Id. at 18 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 22 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) ("There, healthcare workers who have served on the
front line of a pandemic for the last 18 months are now being fired and their practices shuttered.
All for adhering to their constitutionally protected religious beliefs. Their plight is worthy of our
attention. I would grant relief.").
30. Carson as next friend of O.C. v. Makin, 979 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2020), cert. granted, 141
S. Ct. 2883 (2021); Carson as next friend of O. C. v. Makin, 142 S. Ct. 1987 (2022).
31. Espinoza v. Mont. Dcp't of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020).
32. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
33. Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2261.
34. Id. at 2262.
35. Id. at 2254.
36. Id. at 2263 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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other Blaine amendments, was based on anti-Catholic bias and accordingly could not be upheld as constitutional. 37
Some commentators on the cases have noted that the ideal of separation of church and state is gone. 38 Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented
in Carson, Espinoza, and Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v.
Comer.39 In Espinoza, Justice Sotomayor reiterated her Trinity Lu-

theran point, that the decision "weakens this country's longstanding
commitment to a separation of church and state beneficial to both." 40
In Carson, her dissent was even stronger: "In 2017, I feared that the

'

.

Court was 'lead[ing] us ... to a place where separation of church and
state is a constitutional slogan, not a constitutional commitment.' ..
Today, the Court leads us to a place where separation of church and
state becomes a constitutional violation." 4
Making separation of church and state a constitutional violation is

a huge change in the Court's interpretation of religious freedom.
Free exercise won, and establishment lost, in another 2022 case,

Kennedy v. Bremerton School District.4 2 Kennedy was a public-school

high school football coach who led his students in prayer at the end of
each football game. 43 The school asked him to stop, insisting that as a
public employee he must respect the Establishment Clause.44 Kennedy

won 6-3 on free exercise grounds.45 The Court overruled previous Establishment Clause cases, leaving readers wondering once again what
is left of that clause. 46

37. Id. at 2272 (Alito, J., concurring).
38. See, e.g., Ian Millhiser, The Supreme Court's Big Decision on the Separation of
Church
and
State,
Explained,
VOx,
(Jun.
30,
2020),
https://www.vox.com/2020/6/30/21308204/supreme-court-separation-church-state-espinozamontana-school-religion.
39. Carson as next friend of O. C. v. Makin, 142 S. Ct. 1987 (2022); Espinoza, 140 S. Ct.
at 2292 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).; Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, 137 S. Ct.
2012, 2027 (2017) (Breyer, J., concurring).
40. Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2292 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Trinity Lutheran,
137 S. Ct. at 2027 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)).
41. Carson as next friend of O. C. v. Makin, 142 S. Ct. 1987 (2022) (quoting Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct., at 2041 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
42. Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., No. 21-418, 2022 WL 2295034 (U.S. June 27,
2022).
43. Id. at *4.
44. Id. at *4-6.
45. Id. at *3.
46. The majority did not explicitly overrule Lemon, instead asserting that the Court previously "abandoned" the Lemon test and supplanting it with a "historical practices and
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And, five Catholic Justices voted to overrule Roe and Casey, leaving the decision about abortion's legality to the states because abortion
is not a right protected by the Constitution. 47 Roberts concurred, saying

the Court should have upheld the Mississippi law but not overruled the
earlier cases. Justice Sotomayor dissented.

The current Court is composed of seven Catholic Justices: Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Justice Gorsuch is currently an Episcopalian but is included in this essay
because he was raised Catholic. 48 Catholic Justice Barrett replaced the
Jewish Justice Ginsburg. 49 A Court with seven Catholic justices (and
two Jewish justices) is an incredible creation. No Protestant was on the

Court from Justice John Paul Stevens's retirement on June 29, 2010
until Justice Breyer retired in June 2022.50 We have never had a Mus-

lim, Hindu, Buddhist, or openly atheist Supreme Court Justice. 51 The
recent religion cases raise the question of what Catholics have done as
Justices, and whether the Religion Clause teaching has changed, because there are so many Catholics who have replaced the mainlyProtestant justices who supported church-state separation.

2

Protestant

understandings" test. Id. at *13-14. However, as Justice Sotomayor noted in her dissent, the
majority functionally overruled Lemon. Id. at *18 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
47. Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., No. 19-1392, 2022 WL 2276808 (U.S. June
24, 2022); see also Lauren Feiner & Dan Mangan, Trump Takes Credit for End of Roe v. Wade
after his 3 Supreme Court justice picks vote to void abortion rights, CNBS, Jun. 24, 2022,
https://www.cnbc.com/2022/06/24/roe-v-wade-decision-trump-takes-credit-for-supreme-courtabortion-ruling.html.
48. Frank Newport, The Religion of the Supreme Court Justices, GALLUP (April 8, 2022),
https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/391649/religion-supreme-court-justices.aspx.
This article counts Justice Gorsuch, who was raised Catholic, but currently identifies as Episcopalian. Sarah McCammon & Domenico Montanaro, Religion, the Supreme Court and Why it
Matters, NPR (July 7, 2018, 11:42 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/07/07/626711777/religionthe-supreme-court-and-why-it-matters; see also Ronald Brownstein, How Conservative Catholics Became Supreme on GOP's Court, CNN: Fault Lines (Sept. 27, 2020, 4:39 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/27/politics/conservative-catholics-gop-supreme-court/index.html.

49. David Crary, If Barrett Joins, Supreme Court Would Have Six Catholics, AP NEWS
(Sept. 26, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/us-supreme-court-ruth-bader-ginsburg-archivecourts-donald-trump-987e5fb6de8a1a29d 1 cbb00bfl fl948c.
50. Dan Gilgoff, A Supreme Court Without Protestants?, CNN (May 10, 2010,9:53 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/05/03/supreme.court.protestants/index.html.
51. Past U.S. Supreme Court Members, INFOPLEASE, https://www.infoplease.com/biog-

raphies/government-politics/supreme-court (last visited Nov. 1, 2021).
52. Thomas C. Berg, Anti-Catholicism and Modern Church-State Relations, 33 LOY. U.
CHIl. L.J. 121, 125 (2001) ("Today we expect evangelical and fundamentalist Protestants to dismiss the ideal of church-state separation as a "myth." However, in the late 1940s, these groups,
though divided from liberal Protestants on virtually all else, united with them in warning of
Catholic power and in rhetorically defending the strict separation of church and state.")
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Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson replaced Jewish Justice Stephen Breyer

on June 30, 2022.53
The numbers should draw attention to the need for religious diversity on the Supreme Court of the United States. The Catholics have
varied in their perspectives on religious freedom. Justice William Brennan, known as one of the most prominent and productive twentiethcentury Justices from 1956-1990, was a strong defender of separation

of church and state. 54 Many of his successors have been much less separationist, and Justice Sotomayor now argues that separation has be-

come a constitutional violation. 55 Brennan also favored strict scrutiny
in religion cases, while Justice Antonin Scalia upheld neutral and generally applicable laws for everyone, including religious believers. 56

What have the Catholics done? This article examines the decisions
they wrote to see if we can understand what they have emphasized and
accomplished. There have been sixteen Catholic Justices in the history

of the U.S. Supreme Court.57 In chronological order, their names are:
Roger B. Taney
Edward Douglass White
Joseph McKenna
Pierce Butler

Frank Murphy
Sherman Minton
William J. Brennan, Jr.
Antonin Scalia
Anthony Kennedy
Clarence Thomas
John Roberts

Samuel Alito
Sonia Sotomayor
53. John Wagner & Mariana Alfaro, Ketanji Brown Jackson to be Sworn in as Supreme
Court Justice,

Making

History,

WASH.

POST,

Jun.

30,

2022,

https://www.washing-

tonpost.com/politics/2022/06/30/supreme-court-ketanji-brown-jackson-live/.
54. Mary Welek Atwell, William Brennan Jr., THE FIRST AMENDMENT ENCYCLOPEDIA

(2009), https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1321/william-brennan-jr.
55. See infra Section IIl.A.
56. Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in the famous Smith case, while Brennan
dissented. See Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); infra Section III.A.
57. Although Sherman Minton was a Protestant while he was a justice, he was married to
a Catholic and became Catholic after retirement, and he is usually included on lists of Catholic
justices. See supra note 48.
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Neil Gorsuch
Brett Kavanaugh
Amy Coney Barrett.
The cases show differences among the Catholic justices. Justices

Brennan and Sotomayor are more similar to each other than they are to
their colleagues Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Roberts, Alito,
Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Some Catholic justices want a strong
Establishment Clause and others a weak one. Some want strict scrutiny
in the Free Exercise Clause and others neutrality.

There are some definite trends in this Catholic Court, however. It
has approved more funding for religion than earlier Courts. 58 It continues to approve government-sponsored religious monuments as well as
government and government employees' prayer. 59 It also allows religious institutions to fire or otherwise discriminate against their employees' conduct. 60 It is certainly a religion-friendly Court. You might agree

with Linda Greenhouse's conclusion: "When it came to religion, the
project involved reinterpreting-one might say weaponizing-the
Constitution's Free Exercise Clause, turning it from its historic role as

a shield that protected believers from government interference into a
sword that vaulted believers into a position of privilege." 61
Now the stories of the Catholics' differing perspectives on religion and civil rights.
I.
A.

THE FIRST CATHOLICS: TANEY TO MINTON

ChiefJustice Taney

The first six, pre-Brennan Catholic justices have several noteworthy decisions. The first Catholic on the Court, Chief Justice Roger B.

Taney, was nominated by President Jackson and was a member of the
Court from 1836-1864.62 He was the author of the terrible, racist

58. See infra Section V.A.
59. See infra Section IV.
60. See infra Section V.
61. LINDA GREENHOUSE, JUSTICE ON THE BRINK 14 (2021); see also ANDREW L. SEIDEL,
AMERICAN CRUSADE: HOW THE SUPREME COURT IS WEAPONIZING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

(2022).
62. Justices 1789 to Present, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx (last visited Nov. 1, 2021).
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opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford, which was a precursor to the Civil
War. 63 Dred Scott was a slave who had lived in slave and freed states.64
He sued for his freedom. 65 The Court denied jurisdiction over Scott's
lawsuit and did not allow him to be a citizen.. 66 The decision is long
remembered for its racist message, which represented much of what the
Civil War was fought over. The Civil Rights Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments undid some of Dred Scott's message.
Catholics were both racist and anti-racist. In sharp contrast to
Chief Justice Taney was Justice Frank Murphy, who was nominated by

President Franklin Roosevelt and served from 1940-1949.67 Justice
Murphy is one of the strongest critics of racism in the Court's history.
He started tentatively with a concurrence in Hirabayashi,one of the
Japanese internment cases. 68 He dissented in Korematsu, another horrible case in which the majority upheld the internment of Japanese
Americans. 69 Justice Murphy said the Japanese program "falls into the
ugly abyss of racism." 70 Justice Murphy wrote a consistent concurrence
in Ex parte Endo, which allowed a loyal Japanese American to be released.7 In that case, he was "of the view that detention in Relocation

Centers of persons of Japanese ancestry regardless of loyalty is not only
unauthorized by Congress or the Executive but is another example of
the unconstitutional resort to racism inherent in the entire evacuation

program."

72 Justice

Murphy also concurred in Oyama, concluding that

the California Alien Land Law was "nothing more than an outright racial discrimination." 73
Later, Justice Murphy was vote number five to allow parents to be
reimbursed for bus rides to send their children to parochial schools. 74

Everson was a significant law and religion case in an era when the

63. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S.
CONST. amend XIv.

64. Id. at 400.
65. Id.
66. Id at 454.
67. See Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 60.
68. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 109-14 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring).
69. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 233 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
70. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
71. Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 307-08 (1944) (Murphy, J., concurring).
72. Id at 307.
73. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 650 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring).
74. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (5-4 opinion).
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Court vigorously debated whether religions should be funded or not, an
issue that they continue to debate today.
Today some writers believe Justice Murphy was gay, although

that claim has not been definitively proven. 75 He lived most of his life
with a male college friend and never married. 76 Perhaps his experience
as a silent gay man made him more attentive to the damages of racism.
B.

White, McKenna, and Butler
Chief Justice Edward White was nominated by President Cleve-

land and served from 1894-1921.77 Justice Joseph McKenna was chosen by President McKinley and served from 1898 to 1925.78 Justice
Pierce Butler served on the Court from 1923-1939; he was nominated
by President Harding. 79 Thus, from 1898-1921, two Catholics, Justices
White and McKenna, were on the Court at the same time. Justices
McKenna and Butler were together from 1923-1925.
Justice White concurred and Justice McKenna dissented in the
Prohibition cases. 80 They disagreed about the concurrent powers of
Congress and the states. 8 1 Justice White also authored a unanimous

1918 approval of the draft laws. 8 2 He described the religious exemption
written into the act as follows:
The act exempted from subjection to the draft designated United
States and state officials as well as those already in the military or
naval service of the United States, regular or duly ordained ministers of religion and theological students under the conditions provided for, and while relieving from military service in the strict
sense the members of religious sects as enumerated whose tenets
excluded the moral right to engage in war, nevertheless subjected
such persons to the performance of service of a noncombatant character to be defined by the President. 83

75. JOYCE MURDOCH & DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS V.
THE SUPREME COURT (2001).

76. Id77. See Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 60.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 60.
See Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 60.
Nat'l Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920).
Id.
Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
Id. at 376.
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Justice White concluded the exemption was legal, arguing:
[W]e pass without anything but stat[ing] the proposition that an establishment of a religion or an interference with the free exercise
thereof repugnant to the First Amendment resulted from the exemption clauses of the act to which we at the outset referred, because
we think its unsoundness is too apparent to require us to do more. 84
In Crane v. Johnson, Justice McKenna wrote a decision about re-

ligion and medicine. 85 P.L. Crane was a drugless practitioner who used
"faith, hope, and the processes of mental suggestion and mental adaptation" in his business but did not use prayer. 86 He claimed the health
law violated Equal Protection by requiring him to get training and a

medical license but not doing the same for those who used prayer or
religion to heal. 87 The Court upheld the difference between drugless
practitioners and prayer practitioners; the state could regulate the first
but not the second group. 88 Religious freedom kept the Court from regulating religion too much.
Justice Pierce Butler served on the Court from 1923-1939; he was

nominated by President Harding. 89 He is the author of one well-known
90
religion case, Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California.
The

University of California required students to enroll in military training
and would not give them an exemption for religious and conscientious
objection to such training. 9 1 The Court dismissed the students' Fourteenth Amendment claim as "untenable." 92 Moreover, the Court made
a significant point that conscientious objection was a statutory claim,
not a constitutional one. 93 In Justice Butler's words:
The conscientious objector is relieved from the obligation to bear
arms in obedience to no constitutional provision, express or implied; but because, and only because, it has accorded with the policy

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 389-90.
Crane v. Johnson, 242 U.S. 339 (1917)
Id at 340.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 343.
See Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 60.
Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
Id at 250-51.
Id at 262.
Id at 264.
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of Congress thus to relieve him. The privilege of the native-born
conscientious objector to avoid bearing arms comes not from the
Constitution but from the acts of Congress. 94

Today, many people continue to argue that conscientious objection is a
constitutional right, even though its source is in statutory law.
C.

Back to Justice Murphy

Remember Justice Murphy, the strong anti-racist who dissented in
Korematsu? He replaced Justice Butler on the Court in 1940.95 Murphy
wrote a few interesting opinions about religion and joined some key
law and religion decisions. He often had a stake in "preserving freedom
of conscience to the full." 96
Although Justice Murphy joined the majority in Minersville
School Dist. V. Gobitis, which required students to say the pledge of
allegiance, 97 he wrote a concurrence in West Virginia State Board of
Educationv. Barnette, which overruled Gobitis and protected religious
freedom not to pledge to the flag. 98 He first noted that the Constitution
"specifically shelters" freedom to believe and worship, and that

"[r]eflection has convinced me that as a judge I have no loftier duty or
responsibility than to uphold that spiritual freedom to its farthest

reaches." 99 He also wrote:
The trenchant words in the preamble to the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom remain unanswerable: ". . . all attempts to influence [the mind] by temporal punishments, or burdens, or by civil
incapacitations, tend only to beget habits of hypocrisy and mean-

ness, .. ." Any spark of love for country which may be generated in
a child or his associates by forcing him to make what is to him an
empty gesture and recite words wrung from him contrary to his re-

ligious beliefs is overshadowed by the desirability ofpreserving
freedom of conscience to the full. It is in that freedom and the

94. Id.
95. See Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 60.
96. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring).
97.
of Educ.
98.
99.

Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by W. Va. State Bd.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 644-46 (Murphy, J., concurring).
Id. at 645.
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example of persuasion, not in force and compulsion, that the real
unity of America lies. 100
In Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of City of Los Angeles, Justice

Murphy, joined only by Justice Douglas, dissented from the Court's
dismissal of Charles Murdock's claim that ordinances governing charity solicitations violated his free exercise of religion.10 ' In a very short
dissent, Justice Murphy wrote that the Court could have determined the
issues in the case, summarized by the following questions:
(1) Does it violate the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion to prohibit solicitors of religious charities from using boxes or
receptacles in public places except by written permission of city officials? (2) Is that guarantee infringed by a requirement that such

solicitors display an information card issued by city officials?' 0 2
He said the time was "ripe" for the Court to answer the questions in-

stead of passing on them.'

03

Presumably he would have answered the

questions, "Yes".
Justice Murphy was one of four dissenters in Prince v. Massachu-

setts, a well-known case about children and religious freedom.' 04 The
majority upheld the conviction of Sarah Prince for letting a child sell
magazines on the streets in violation of child labor law.10 5 Writing
alone, however, Justice Murphy said Massachusetts's attempt "to pro-

hibit a child from exercising her constitutional right to practice her religion on the public streets cannot .

.

. be sustained."1 06 He said the

state could not prove that the child's religious exercise endangered the
community in any way.' 07 He was also skeptical whether any harm
could come to the child from the activity.' 0 8 He did not believe that this

100.
Religious
101.
102.

Id. at 646 (Murphy, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting Virginia's State for
Freedom, today codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 57-1 (2022)).
Rescue Army v. Municipal Ct. ofL.A., 331 U.S. 549 (1947).
Id. at 585 (Murphy, J., dissenting).

103. Id.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (5-4 decision).
Id. at 171.
Id. at 171 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
See Id. at 174-75.

108. Id.
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activity subjected children to any dangers from the streets.109 In a long
paragraph about religious freedom, he wrote:
No chapter in human history has been so largely written in terms of
persecution and intolerance as the one dealing with religious freedom. From ancient times to the present day, the ingenuity of man
has known no limits in its ability to forge weapons of oppression for
use against those who dare to express or practice unorthodox religious beliefs. And the Jehovah's Witnesses are living proof of the

fact that even in this nation, conceived as it was in the ideals of
freedom, the right to practice religion in unconventional ways is still
far from secure. Theirs is a militant and unpopular faith, pursued
with a fanatical zeal. They have suffered brutal beatings; their property has been destroyed; they have been harassed at every turn by
the resurrection and enforcement of little used ordinances and statutes. To them, along with other present-day religious minorities, be-

falls the burden of testing our devotion to the ideals and constitutional guarantees of religious freedom. We shouldtherefore hesitate
before approving the applicationof a statute that might be used as

another instrument of oppression. Religious freedom is too sacred
a right to be restricted or prohibited in any degree without convinc10
ing proof that a legitimate interest of the state is in grave danger.'

Justice Murphy also dissented in Cleveland v. United States,
where Mormons were convicted of violating the Mann Act, taking girls
or women across state lines because of their practice of polygamy."'
Justice Murphy said their actions had nothing to do with white slavery:
I disagree with the conclusion that polygamy is "in the same genus"
as prostitution and debauchery and hence within the phrase "any
other immoral purpose" simply because it has sexual connotations

and has "long been branded as immoral in the law" of this nation.
Such reasoning ignores reality and results in an unfair application

of the statutory words." 2
Justice Murphy recognized polygamy's long religious history and objected to the Court's characterization of polygamy as "a notorious

109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 175.
Id. at 175-76 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 24-29 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 25 (quoting the majority opinion).
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example of promiscuity." 1 3 Instead, like monogamy, it was a different
form of marriage.1 4
Justice Murphy was a repeated friend to the Jehovah's Witnesses
as he was in Prince, the child labor case. He dissented in a 5-4 opinion

when the Court originally upheld the state's licensing of Jehovah's
Witnesses who were going door to door.1 5 That case, Jones v. City of
Opelika, was vacated." 6 Justice Murphy joined Justice Douglas's 5-4
decision in Murdock v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, concluding

that a state requirement for Jehovah's Witnesses to pay for licenses before they could solicit door to door was unconstitutional.' In another
Jehovah's Witness case, he concurred that a licensing requirement was

unconstitutional.

18

In that opinion, he argued in response to the dis-

sent's point that the majority exempted religions from all taxes:
It is claimed that the effect of our decision is to subsidize religion.
But this is merely a harsh way of saying that to prohibit the taxation

of religious activities is to give substance to the constitutional right
of religious freedom . . . There is an obvious difference between
taxing commercial property and investments undertaken for profit,
whatever use is made of the income, and laying a tax directly on an
activity that is essentially religious in purpose and character or on
an exercise of the privilege of free speech and free publication.
It is wise to remember that the taxing and licensing power is a dangerous and potent weapon which, in the hands of unscrupulous or

bigoted men, could be used to suppress freedoms and destroy religion unless it is kept within appropriate bounds."19

Justice Murphy also joined some important religious freedom decisions. He joined Justice Black's 5-4 decision in Everson v. Board of

Education of Ewing Township, allowing reimbursement of school bus
ride fares to parochial school children.1 20 He joined Justice Black's 81 decision in People of State of Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 19 (majority opinion).
Id. at 25-26 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942), vacated, 319 U.S. 103 (1943).
Id.
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944).
Id. at 578-79 (Murphy, J., concurring).
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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Education of School District No. 71, Champaign County, Illinois,

which banned, as a violation of the Establishment Clause, letting public
school students take religion classes taught by clergy that were held on
public school grounds.12 1 As Justice Black wrote:
[T]he First Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion
and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is
left free from the other within its respective sphere. Or, as we said
in the Everson case, the First Amendment had erected a wall between Church and State which must be kept high and impregna-

ble. 122
Justice Murphy was a pro-religious freedom justice, and especially pro-

religious minorities, just as he had been pro-racial minorities in Korematsu.
D. From Minton to Brennan

Justice Sherman Minton12 3 served from 1949-1956, was chosen
by President Truman, and was replaced by Justice William Brennan in
1956.124 Justice Minton joined Justice Douglas's opinion in Fowler v.
Rhode Island, which ruled that it was unconstitutional for the state to
allow some religions, but not Jehovah's Witnesses, to preach in Slater
Park. 2 5 Fowler, a Jehovah's Witness minister, had been arrested after
giving his religious talk even though "Catholics could hold mass in
Slater Park and Protestants could conduct their church services there
without violating the ordinance." 26 Justice Douglas cited Niemotko v.
Maryland as being "on all fours with" Fowler.'12 Justice Minton had
previously joined Chief Justice Vinson's opinion in Niemotko, ruling
that Maryland could not preclude Jehovah's Witnesses from preaching
in public parks while allowing other groups to do so. 12 8 Justice Minton
121. I1. ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
122. Id. at 212.
123. Although Sherman Minton was a Protestant while he was a justice, he was married
to a Catholic and became Catholic after retirement, and he is usually included on lists of Catholic
justices. Nomi Stolzenberg, Religious Identity and Supreme Court Justices-a BriefHistory,
THE CONVERSATION (Oct. 19, 2020, 8:24 AM), https://theconversation.com/religious-identityand-supreme-court-justices-a-brief-history-146999.
124.

See Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 60.

125.
126.
127.
128.

Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953).
Id. at 69.
Id. (citing Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272-73 (1951)).
Niemotko, 340 U.S. 268.
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had also joined Justice Douglas's 6-3 opinion in Zorach v. Clauson,
which ruled New York's program allowing public school students to
go to religious schools for religious instruction while leaving other students in public school was constitutional.1 29 Justice Douglas distinguished this scenario from McCollum, the 8-1 decision that Justice
Murphy had joined, because, in Zorach, everything was held in and
paid for by the religious schools.' 30
Justice Minton wrote a majority opinion in Adler v. Board of Education of City of New York, upholding a New York rule not to hire

teachers connected to organizations advocating the overthrow of the
government, including Communists.' 3 1 Such teachers could speak and
assemble as they wanted but were not entitled to work in a state school
system.132
And then it was Justice Brennan's turn. In 1967, in Keyishian v.
Boardof Regents of University of State of New York, Justice Brennan
wrote a 5-4 majority opinion overruling Adler and ruling that state university provisions requiring public employees to renounce Com-

munism were unconstitutional.'

33

Justice Brennan served on the Court

1 34

for 34 years.

II. MODERN CATHOLICS TAKE THE BENCH, STARTING WITH JUSTICE
WILLIAM BRENNAN (1956-1990)

Justice William Brennan was nominated by President Dwight D.
Eisenhower, and took office in 1956, replacing Justice Minton.1 35 Jus-

tice Brennan was a devout Catholic who went to Mass every week. 136
He is also remembered as a strict separationist, a position which many
of his Catholic successors later repudiated. 137 In looking at Justice
129. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
130. Id. at 309-10.
131. Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952), overruledin part by Keyishian v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
132. Adler, 342 U.S. at 490-93.
133. Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Adler v. Bd.
of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952), overruled in part by Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
N.Y., 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
134. See Justices 1789 to Present,supra note 60.
135. See Justices 1789 to Present,supra note 60.
136. See Constance Phelps, Like Biden, my Supreme Court Grandfatherwas Shamedfor
Going

to

Mass,

NATIONAL

CATHOLIC

REPORTER

(Jun.

28,

2021),

https://www.ncronline.org/news/opinion/biden-my-supreme-court-j ustice-grandfather-wasshamed-going-mass.
137. See infra Section V.
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Brennan's long history on the Court, three features of his religious freedom jurisprudence dominate. First, he wanted to protect every individual's religious freedom against attack no matter what the religion was.

Second, he agreed with other Court members that public welfare legislation, like busing, should go to the religions. Third, he was strict in
keeping government from funding religion. Such separation protected
the state from the church and the church from the state. If individual

religious freedom were really to be protected, the government could
not intrude on it, and neutrality must be observed.1 38
A.

For the FreeExercise of Religion

Justice Brennan dissented in a 1961 case, Braunfeld v. Brown,
where the majority upheld the constitutionality of Sunday closing

laws.1 39 The majority upheld Sunday laws as neutral days of rest without fully appreciating their influence on religion.' 40 In contrast, Justice
Brennan said the state had wrongly "put an individual to a choice be-

tween his business and his religion."141 "Their effect is that no one may
at one and the same time be an Orthodox Jew and compete effectively
with his Sunday-observing fellow tradesmen."1 42 Justice Brennan did
not want religious people to be forced to leave their religions behind as
the closing laws required.
This perspective on religious freedom was made even more emphatically in Justice Brennan's most famous decision about religion:

his opinion for the Court in Sherbert v. Verner. 43 Sherbert would not
work on Saturdays because she was a Seventh Day Adventist. 14 4 South
Carolina refused to pay her unemployment benefits because she could
have worked on Saturday.1 4 5 Justice Brennan's majority ruled that the
state had forced Sherbert to choose between religion and work, just as
138. For commentary on Brennan's writings, see, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, The Religion Clauses
andJustice Brennan in Full, 87 CALIF. 1105 (1999); Rodney Grunes & Jon Veen, Justice Brennan, Catholicism, andthe EstablishmentClause, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 527 (2001); Nadine Strossen,
Justice Brennan and the Religion Clauses, 11 PACE L. REV. 401 (1991); Arlin M. Adams, Justice Brennan and the Religion Clauses: The Concept of a "Living Constitution", 139 U. PA. L.

REV. 1319 (1991).
139. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 610-16 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 605 (majority opinion) ("[T]he Sunday law simply regulates a secular activity
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 611 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 613.
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
Id. at 399-400.
Id.
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it had in Braunfeld.146 Justice Brennan used a strict scrutiny test to protect Sherbert's freedom, meaning the government had to have a "compelling state interest" to put a burden on her religion. 147 He saw no such
interest in her case. 14 8 He was promoting neutrality toward religion so
that Saturday and Sunday worshippers could be treated the same.
Of course, if Braunfeldhad come out differently, Sherbert might

have as well. Without a Sunday closing law, Sherbert would not have
run into trouble with the state in the first place. Sherbert is discussed
frequently today because of its apparent differences with Justice Antonin Scalia's free exercise opinion in Employment Division v. Smith. 149
In reaching his Sherbert conclusion, Justice Brennan cited Ever-

son, the Catholic school bus case where Justice Murphy had provided
the fifth vote to uphold provision of bus costs to parochial school children's parents.150 Brennan said:
This holding but reaffirms a principle that we announced a decade
and a half ago, namely that no State may "exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-

believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because
of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation."15 1
Justice Brennan later wrote the majority opinion protecting the
unemployment rights of Seventh-Day Adventist Paula Hobbie who

could not work on her Sabbath, which ran from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday. 152 Relying on Sherbert, Justice Brennan concluded she
could not be penalized for setting her work schedule in order to obey
her religion. 5 3 Justice Antonin Scalia, who joined the Court in 1986,

agreed with Justice Brennan's Hobbie argument. 15 4 Justice Brennan
joined Justice Burger's opinion reaching a similar conclusion in

146.
147.
148.
149.

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 406.
Id. at 402.
Id. at 408.
Compare Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 410, with Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 410 (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947)).
Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (1947)).
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
Id.
Justices 1789 to Present, supranote 60; Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 136.
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Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Divi-

sion.1
Justice Brennan cited Sherbert in his concurrence in McDaniel v.

Paty, a case about a Tennessee law that disqualified religious ministers
from holding elective office:
If appellant were to renounce his ministry, presumably he could re-

gain eligibility for elective office, but if he does not, he must forgo
an opportunity for political participation he otherwise would enjoy.

Sherbert and Torcaso compel the conclusion that because the challenged provision requires appellant to purchase his right to engage

in the ministry by sacrificing his candidacy it impairs the free exercise of his religion.1 5 6
Justice Brennan had previously joined Justice Burger's unanimous decision in Torcaso, which invalidated a state rule requiring public officials to believe in God.157
Justice Brennan wrote a dissent in Goldman v. Weinberger, while

the majority upheld an Air Force regulation that prohibited Simcha
Goldman, who was Jewish, from wearing a head covering. 5 8 Brennan
wrote with his usual emphasis on individual religious freedom:
Simcha Goldman invokes this Court's protection of his First
Amendment right to fulfill one of the traditional religious obligations of a male Orthodox Jew-to cover his head before an omnipresent God. The Court's response to Goldman's request is to abdicate its role as principal expositor of the Constitution and protector

of individual liberties in favor of credulous deference to unsupported assertions of military necessity. I dissent.

The First Amendment, however, restrains the Government's ability
to prevent an Orthodox Jewish serviceman from, or punish him for,
59
wearing a yarmulke.1

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of the Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 634 (1978) (Brennan, J. concurring).
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
Id. at 513-14 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Congress later allowed Jews to wear yarmulkes in the military by statute. 160 But Goldman stood against it over Justice Brennan's dissent.
Justice Brennan dissented from Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's
well-known decision in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective

Association, where the majority upheld the federal government's use
of Native American property for its own construction projects. 161 Justice Scalia joined Justice O'Connor's majority opinion. 162 Justice Brennan, in contrast, believed that the government was harming Native
Americans' religion without a compelling interest and that the govern-

ment's action "threatens the very existence of a Native American religion[:]"163
Today, the Court holds that a federal land-use decision that promises to destroy an entire religion does not burden the practice of that
faith in a manner recognized by the Free Exercise Clause. Having
thus stripped respondents and all other Native Americans of any
constitutional protection against perhaps the most serious threat to
their age-old religious practices, and indeed to their entire way of
life, the Court assures us that nothing in its decision "should be read
to encourage governmental insensitivity to the religious needs of
any citizen." I find it difficult, however, to imagine conduct more
insensitive to religious needs than the Government's determination
to build a marginally useful road in the face of uncontradicted evidence that the road will render the practice of respondents' religion
impossible. Nor do I believe that respondents will derive any solace
from the knowledge that although the practice of their religion will
become "more difficult" as a result of the Government's actions,
they remain free to maintain their religious beliefs. Given today's
ruling, that freedom amounts to nothing more than the right to believe that their religion will be destroyed. The safeguarding of such
a hollow freedom not only makes a mockery of the "policy of the

United States to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the[ir]

160. See, e.g., Brett Curry, Goldman v. Weinberger (1986), THE FIRST AMENDMENT
ENCYCLOPEDIA,
https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/285/goldman-v-weinberger#:-:text=Weinberger%20(1 986)&text=In%20Goldman%20v.,soldiers%20from%20wcaring%20religious%20apparel (last visited Jun. 25, 2022) (explaining
Congress's passage of the Religious Apparel Amendment).
161. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 458 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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traditional religions," it fails utterly to accord with the dictates of
the First Amendment. 164
Justice Brennan wrote the majority decision in Johnson v. Robi-

son, allowing the government to distinguish between conscientious objectors and those who agree to the draft by giving educational benefits
to the draft people only. 165 In this case, Justice Brennan said there was
not really a burden on religion.1 66
In addition to Free Exercise, Brennan had a lot to say about the

Establishment Clause and public funding of religion. He defended
funding of public welfare, but not funding of religion.
B.

Public Welfare Should Go to Religions
As we read above, Justice Murphy joined some important reli-

gious freedom decisions. He was vote number five in Justice Black's
5-4 decision in Everson v. Boardof Education of Ewing Township, al-

lowing reimbursement of school bus ride fares to parochial school children.' 67 He joined Justice Black's 8-1 decision in People of State of
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education of School DistrictNo.
71, Champaign County, Illinois, which banned letting public school
students take religion classes in their public schools as a violation of
the Establishment Clause.' 68
Lemon v. Kurtzman is the influential Establishment Clause case
that has long puzzled and divided the Court.' 69 Justice Brennan joined
the majority in refusing government aid to Pennsylvania and Rhode

Island religious schools.' 70 He dissented from the Court's decision to
give aid to religious universities."' The majority's Establishment
Clause test in Lemon, which the Court has applied repeatedly through-

out the years, as in Edwards v, Aguillard, says that, to avoid an Establishment violation, "[f]irst, the legislature must have adopted the law
with a secular purpose. Second, the statute's principal or primary effect

164. Id. at 476-77 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Id. at 453-55 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1996.
165. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
166. Id. at 384-86.
167. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (5-4 decision).
168. I1. ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
169. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See infra notes 574-82, Lemon is overruled by Kennedy.
170. Id. at 642 (Brennan, J., concurring).

171. Id.
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must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion. Third, the statute must not result in an excessive entanglement of government with
religion." 72
In Justice Brennan's view, no government aid should go to reli-

gion but must go to public welfare. Justice Brennan was the only Catholic on the Court when Lemon was decided.1 73 In a concurring opinion,
he explained his own, three-part Lemon test, which differed from the
majority's:
What the Framers meant to foreclose, and what our decisions under
the Establishment Clause have forbidden, are those involvements of
religious with secular institutions which (a) serve the essentially religious activities of religious institutions; (b) employ the organs of
government for essentially religious purposes; or (c) use essentially

religious means to serve governmental ends, where secular means
would suffice. When the secular and religious institutions become
involved in such a manner, there inhere in the relationship precisely
those dangers-as much to church as to state-which the Framers
feared would subvert religious liberty and the strength of a system
of secular government.1 74
In Lemon, Justice Brennan wanted to know if the universities were sec-

tarian because the Act "is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes
grants of federal tax monies to sectarian institutions[.]"1 75 "Sectarian"
means religious; the rule is no government aid for religion.
In 1970, the Court upheld a tax exemption for the properties of

religious organizations.'

76 Chief Justice

Burger ruled the state statutory

exemption for organizations using their properties "exclusively" for religious purposes did not violate the Establishment Clause.1 77 Justice

Brennan concurred for reasons he had set out in School District of
Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp, which set out the same
test he used again in Lemon.' 78 Defending a historical account of the

text, he used the same three-part test quoted above. He reasoned that
172. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987) (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971)).
173. See Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 60.
174. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 643 (Brennan, J., concurring).
175. Id. at 642.
176. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
177. Id. at 666-68.
178. Id. at 680-81 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Sch. Dist. Of Abington Twp. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,230 (1963)); see also Lemon, 403 U.S. at 643 (Brennan, J., concurring)).

2022]

WHAT DID THOSE SIXTEEN JUSTICES SAY?

187

the tax exemption was not a subsidy to religion but an action that had
tons of history behind it in the states and let the organizations engage
in secular activities. 17 9 Additionally, tax money is more passive than a
subsidy, and this exemption shows that the state "values religion
among a variety of private, nonprofit enterprises that contribute to the

diversity of the Nation."' 80
Justice Brennan wrote an often-cited rule about the Establishment
Clause in his 5-4 majority decision in Larson v. Valente, which ruled
that a Minnesota law that imposed registration and reporting requirements on religious organizations that solicit more than 50% of their

funds from nonmembers violated the Establishment Clause. 18 1 As he
put it, in an often-quoted text from the opinion, "[t]he clearest com-

mand of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination
cannot be officially preferred over another."

182

The 50% rule did just

that, so it was unconstitutional.
Tax law did not always protect the religions. Justice Brennan
joined Justice Burger's decision denying tax-exempt status to Bob
Jones University because of its racism. 183 He dissented from Chief Justice Rehnquist's decision to deny standing to Americans United for

Separation of Church and State, which had complained that the government was giving property to Valley Forge Christian College without
getting any payment for it.1 84 Justice Brennan said the majority's stand-

ing decision would "obfuscate, rather than inform, our understanding
of the meaning of rights under the law[,]" which was supposed to pre1 85
vent the government from funding religion.

Justice Brennan was consistent on this test. He defended the
Court's decision in Everson and also joined Boardof Educationof Central School District No. 1 v. Allen, a case upholding textbook aid to

religious schools. 186 Everson and Allen were limited to reimbursing
parents' bus money or book loans, which Brennan did not see as funding religion.187 In Lemon, Justice Brennan cited Bradfield v. Roberts,

179. Walz, 397 U.S. 680.
180. Id. at 693.
181. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
182. Id. at 244.
183. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
184. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
185. Id. at 490 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
186. Bd. of Educ. V. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
187. Id.; Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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which allowed aid to a Catholic hospital because the hospital itself was
secular. 188 In contrast, the aid in Lemon was "too close a proximity"
between church and state, which risked "the secularization of a
creed." 89 At the religious schools, secular education was "inextricably
intertwined" with a religious mission, so funding could not be given.1 90
In his words, "for more than a century, the consensus, enforced by legislatures and courts with substantial consistency, has been that public
subsidy of sectarian schools constitutes an impermissible involvement
of secular with religious institutions. "191
Justice Brennan repeated his "no-aid to religion" rule in numerous

cases. In Hunt v. McNair, citing his earlier cases, he dissented from a
majority decision giving aid to South Carolina Baptist colleges.19 2 In
Meek v. Pittenger, he agreed with Justice Stewart's majority decision

refusing too much aid to religious schools. 193 But he disagreed with
Part III of Justice Stewart's opinion, which ruled that Allen-a textbook
precedent that Justice Brennan had joined-made the provision of textbooks constitutional.1 94 Following Lemon, he thought such aid would
encourage political divisiveness among citizens who agreed or disagreed with the program, so it was prohibited:
For Allen, which I joined, was decided before Kurtzman [i.e.,
Lemon] ordained that the political-divisiveness factor must be involved in the weighing process, and understandably neither the parties to Allen nor the Court addressed that factor in that case. But
whether or not Allen can withstand overruling in light of Kurtzman
and Nyquist, which I question, it is clear that Kurtzman-which, I

repeat, applied the factor to a Pennsylvania program that included
reimbursement for the cost of textbooks-requires that the plurality
weigh the factor in the instant case. Further, giving the factor the
weight that Kurtzman and Nyquist require, compels, in my view the

conclusion that the textbook loan program of Act 195, equally with
the program for loan of instructional materials and equipment, violates the Establishment Clause. The plurality's answer is that a

188. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 643 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing
Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899)).
189. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 649 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring).
190. Id. at 657.
191. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 648-649.
192. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
193. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S.
793 (2000).
194. Id.

2022]

WHAT DID THOSE SIXTEEN JUSTICES SAY?

189

difference in result is justified because Act 195 distinguishes be-

tween recipients of the loans: textbooks are lent to students, while
instructional material and equipment are lent directly to the schools.
That answer will not withstand analysis.' 95
Justice Brennan also dissented in Roemer v. Board of Public
Works of Maryland, where the majority upheld Maryland nonsectarian

aid to religious schools, because "[g]eneral subsidies of religious activities would, of course, constitute impermissible state involvement with
religion."' 96 In Wolman v. Walter, where the majority upheld Ohio aid
to religious schools, he dissented, reiterating his point that religion
should not receive state money.' 97

The distinction between the religious and the secular carried over
to other Justice Brennan opinions. He dissented in N.L.R.B. v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago, where the majority ruled that lay teachers at reli98
gious schools were not covered by the National Labor Relations Act.'
Justice Brennan was very critical of the majority's reasoning, arguing
1 99
In
that they had amended the legislation in a non-judicial manner.

such circumstances, the law should have reached employees of religious schools. 20 0
But Justice Brennan also wrote important precedents concluding

that religious property disputes could not be decided by the courts. He
wrote the unanimous decision in Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'1 Presbyterian Church, concluding that the
courts could not decide decisions about church property. 2 0' Brennan

rejected the "departure-from-doctrine" rule, which would have allowed
195. Meek, 421 U.S. at 378-79. (Brennan, J., dissenting in part). Brennan had joined the
majority opinion invalidating New York aid to religious schools in Committeefor Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), overruled by Mitchell, 530 U.S.
793.
196. Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736, 770 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
197. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 255-56 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part),
overruled by Mitchell, 530 U.S. 793.
198. N.L.R.B. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
199. Id. at 511-14 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
200. Sotomayor agreed with the Court's conclusion in Advocate Health Care Network v.
Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017), that the statute granted church plans protection from ERISA
to many organizations. She worried, however, that some of the large health-care providers
should not have been included by Congress. These providers were for-profit, earned billions of
dollars, and competed with secular companies that had to comply with ERISA.
201. Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
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courts to decide whether churches had acted in accordance with their
own teachings. 202 This set up a long run of cases where churches were

allowed to do what they wanted with property without court intervention. His 7-2 opinion in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocesefor U. S. of
America v. Milivojevich followed the same rule and said the civil courts

were required to accept that ecclesiastical decisions about faith were
made without judicial review.20 3 This was another approach to separa-

tion of church and state.
Justice Brennan's First Amendment jurisprudence also led him to

conclusions about prayer.
C.

Watch Out for Prayer

Justice Brennan joined the Court's opinion in Engel v. Vitale, a
famous decision that removed prayer from public schools. 204 He concurred in a similar opinion, School District of Abington Township, Pa.
v. Schempp, which concluded that public school Bible readings and
prayer violated the Establishment Clause. 205 There, too, he gave his
Lemon test:
What the Framers meant to foreclose, and what our decisions under
the Establishment Clause have forbidden, are those involvements of
religious with secular institutions which (a) serve the essentially religious activities of religious institutions; (b) employ the organs of
government for essentially religious purposes; or (c) use essentially
religious means to serve governmental ends, where secular means
would suffice. 206

He referred to neutrality, which was always significant in his work on
religion: "But in the long view the independence of both church and
state in their respective spheres will be better served by close adherence
to the neutrality principle."207
On government prayer, Justice Brennan dissented in Marsh v.

Chambers, a case that has recently been vigorously reaffirmed by the

202. Id. at 450.
203. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713-15 (1976).
204. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
205. Sch. Dist. Of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
206. Id. at 294-95.
207. Id at 246.
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Court. 208 Justice Brennan believed that legislative prayer is unconstitu-

tional as a clear violation of the Establishment Clause. 209 He acknowledged that, at one point, he may have agreed with the majority:
Moreover, disagreement with the Court requires that I confront the
fact that some 20 years ago, in a concurring opinion in one of the
cases striking down official prayer and ceremonial Bible reading in
the public schools, [i.e., Schempp], I came very close to endorsing

essentially the result reached by the Court today. Nevertheless, after
much reflection, I have come to the conclusion that I was wrong
then and that the Court is wrong today. I now believe that the practice of official invocational prayer, as it exists in Nebraska and most
other State Legislatures, is unconstitutional. It is contrary to the doctrine as well the underlying purposes of the Establishment Clause,

and it is not saved either by its history or by any of the other considerations suggested in the Court's opinion. 21 0
Justice Brennan thought it was clear that any group of law students

would have found that, under Lemon, the prayer was unconstitutional:
Legislative prayer .. . intrudes on the right to conscience by forcing
some legislators either to participate in a "prayer opportunity," with

which they are in basic disagreement, or to make their disagreement
a matter of public comment by declining to participate. It forces all
residents of the State to support a religious exercise that may be
contrary to their own beliefs. It requires the State to commit itself
on fundamental theological issues. It has the potential for degrading

religion by allowing a religious call to worship to be intermeshed
with a secular call to order. And it injects religion into the political
sphere by creating the potential that each and every selection of a
chaplain, or consideration of a particular prayer, or even reconsideration of the practice itself, will provoke a political battle along
religious lines and ultimately alienate some religiously identified
11
group of citizens.2

208. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795-823 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014).
209. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 795-76.
211. Id. at 808 (citation omitted); see also id at 800-01 ("I have no doubt that, if any
group of law students were asked to apply the principles of Lemon to the question of legislative
prayer, they would nearly unanimously find the practice to be unconstitutional.").
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Justice Brennan also joined the opinion finding Alabama's moment-of-

silence law in Wallace v. Jaffree unconstitutional. 2 12
Using the same reasoning as in those cases, Justice Brennan also

disliked government-sponsored religious monuments because they represented government support for religion.
D.

Opposing Public Religious Monuments

Because he valued the importance of separation of church and
state, Justice Brennan always opposed government religious monu-

ments. He joined a per curiam decision holding a Ten Commandments
display unconstitutional in Stone v. Graham.213 In Lynch v. Donnelly,

he dissented from the Court's decision to find a Rhode Island nativity
scene constitutional. 214 His dissent observed that the Court's "lessthan-vigorous application of the Lemon test suggests that its commit-

ment to those standards may only be superficial," and expressed concern that the recent Marsh test had undermined the standards. 215 He
thought religious monuments were religious, and, as such, should not
be supported by the government:
[O]ur precedents in my view compel the holding that Pawtucket's

inclusion of a life-sized display depicting the biblical description of
the birth of Christ as part of its annual Christmas celebration is unconstitutional. Nothing in the history of such practices or the setting
in which the City's creche is presented obscures or diminishes the
plain fact that Pawtucket's action amounts to an impermissible governmental endorsement of a particular faith.2 16

The Court's precedents on monuments and other religious freedom
cases changed after Catholic Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas,
joined the Court.

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S 39 (1980).
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
Id. at 696 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 695.
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III. THEN THREE CATHOLICS JOIN THE COURT WITH THEIR OWN
PERSPECTIVES: SCALIA (1986) AND KENNEDY (1988); THEN THOMAS

(1991)
Justice Antonin Scalia was nominated by President Ronald

Reagan and served on the Court from 1986 until his death in 2016.217
Justice Anthony Kennedy was also nominated by Reagan and served
on the Court from 1988 until he retired in 2018.218 They both served

with Justice Brennan on the Court until he retired in 1990.219 Justice
Clarence Thomas was nominated by President George H.W. Bush and
22 1
Those
joined the Court in 1991.220 He remains on the Court today.

three new justices revisited some of Justice Brennan's precedents.
A.

Free Exercise is Revisited in Smith

Just as Justice Brennan is famous for writing Sherbert, Justice
Scalia wrote a leading and controversial free exercise case in Employ222
ment Division, Departmentof Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.

Justice Kennedy joined Scalia's majority opinion in that case, while
Justice Brennan dissented.2 23 Smith was a case about Native American
drug counselors who were fired for using peyote at a religious ritual

and tried to receive unemployment benefits.22 4 Justice Scalia concluded
everyone had to follow neutral laws of general applicability, while Jus22
tice Brennan still sought Sherbert strict scrutiny. s
In Smith I, Justice Scalia joined a majority opinion that sent the

case back to Oregon, so that the state court could clarify whether peyote
was legal in Oregon. 226 Justice Brennan dissented from that opinion,
relying on his strict scrutiny opinions in Sherbert, Thomas, and Hobbie.227 He did not think that the peyote question was ambiguous or

217. Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 60.
2 18. Justices 1789 to Present,supra note 60.
21 9. Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 60.
220. Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 60.
221. Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 60.
222. Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (Smith 11), supersededby statute, Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-bb4.
223. Smith, 494 U.S. at 873.
224. Id. at 883.
225. Compare Id. at 901, with Id. at 908-09 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
226. Emp. Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988) (Smith 1).
227. Id. at 674-75 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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related to the unemployment compensation statute. 228 Justice Brennan

thought the Native Americans should be compensated. 229
The issue was whether the First Amendment granted Native
Americans a free exercise right to receive unemployment compensa-

tion benefits even though they, as drug counselors, had been fired for
using peyote in a religious ritual. 2 30 Because drug use was against Oregon law, and because a criminal law was involved, in Smith II, Justice

Scalia said the courts had no business granting an exemption. 231 The
legislature could do it, but the courts could not. Unlike Sherbert and
some other compensation cases, Smith II was a case that involved

something illegal, drug activity, and it was not the Court's job to excuse
individuals from complying with the law. 232 Quoting Reynolds, the
Court's old case refusing to exempt a Mormon from the anti-polygamy

laws, Justice Scalia wrote, "[t]o permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and
in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself." 233 Justice Kennedy joined Justice Scalia's opinion. 2 34 Justice Scalia accepted

Sherbert but said it did not apply because there was a criminal law at
stake in Smith II that was not present in Sherbert.2 35
In contrast, Justice Brennan joined Justice Blackmun's dissent

with Justice Thurgood Marshall. 2 36 A statute that "burdens the free exercise of religion ... may stand only if the law in general, and the
State's refusal to allow a religious exemption in particular, are justified

by a compelling interest that cannot be served by less restrictive
means." 237 Indeed, the dissent accused the majority of "effectuat[ing] a
wholesale overturning of settled law concerning the Religion Clauses
of our Constitution. "238 Examining peyote and the Court's earlier reli-

gion cases in detail, the dissenters concluded that the government could

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id. at 678.
Id at 676-77.
Id. at 884.
Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876 (1990).
Id. at 878-79.
Id at 879.
Id. at 873.
Id. at 884.
Id. at 873.
Id. at 907 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 908.
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not meet strict scrutiny and the least restrictive means tests in its argument that peyote was like all other drugs in the War on Drugs. 239
The Court clarified Smith II in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye

v. City of Hialeah.240 Justice Kennedy wrote this opinion, concluding
that Hialeah violated the Church's rights by banning animal sacrifice
while allowing the killing of animals in other contexts. 2 4 1 The decision
was unanimous, with justices making different points. 24 2 Justices Scalia
and Thomas joined Justice Kennedy's opinion. 243 Justice Scalia also

wrote a concurrence. 244 Justice Kennedy's opinion clarified when a law
is neutral and general, explaining that a law targeting animal sacrifice
violated the First Amendment by discriminating against religion. 24 5

Justice Scalia took issue with some of Justice Kennedy's description of
what general and neutral laws are. In particular, Justice Scalia did not
want the Court to examine legislative intent, 246 although Justice Kennedy would allow it. 2 4 7 Justice Thomas joined them without a separate

concurrence. 248 We will see later that the status of Smith was at stake
in the Court's recent decision in Fulton.24 9

Prisoners' free exercise religious rights often get to the Court.
Turner v. Safley was a unanimous case that set a lower threshold for
50
the government to meet when it infringed prisoners' religious rights.
Justice Scalia joined Justice O'Connor's majority opinion, which was
fairly deferential to the government.2 5 1Justice Brennan, however, concurred in part and dissented in part.25 2 He joined only Part IIIB of the
majority opinion, which concluded that the state could not restrict marriage as it had in that case.2 5 3 Justice Brennan also joined Justice Stevens's dissent, which argued that the majority had inappropriately accepted the Department of Justice's mostly speculative arguments about

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id. at 908-09.
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
Id. at 537.
Id. at 522.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 558 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
Id. at 540.
Id.
See infra text accompanying notes 727-51.
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 87.
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A week later, in O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, Justice

Scalia joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, which made

it fairly easy to restrict prisoners' religious freedom.25 5 Justice Brennan
dissented in the 5-4 case, again rejecting the easy standard of govern-

ment review and arguing the case should be remanded for review under
Turner.256 Justice Brennan thought the Court had too easily rejected the
prisoners' argument that their religious rights were violated when they

could not attend the central religious ceremony of their Muslim faith.257
B.

Smith leads to RFRA

Smith provoked much outrage among the public and Congress,
who did not see anything good in what the Court had ruled. Accordingly, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA), using its Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment powers so

that courts would apply strict scrutiny to all the states and municipalities. 258 RFRA prohibits "[g]overnment"

from "substantially bur-

den[ing]" a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from
a rule of general applicability unless the government can demonstrate
the burden "(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that . .. interest." 25 9
RFRA hit the Court in City ofBoerne v. Flores.260 The Court ruled

that Congress did not have the power to require the states to obey the
compelling interest/least restrictive means test. 26 1 Justice Kennedy
wrote the opinion, concluding that Congress had exceeded its Section
5 powers in applying RFRA to the states. 262 Justice Thomas joined his
opinion, and Justice Scalia joined most of it. Justice Kennedy reasoned:
There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury

to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.
Lacking such a connection, legislation may become substantive in

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id.
O'Lonc v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
Id. at 354 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id.
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C.
Id.
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
Id. at 536.
Id.

§ 2000bb-1.
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operation and effect. History and our case law support drawing the
distinction, one apparent from the text of the Amendment. 263
Congress's ruling was not congruent and proportional because they had

not undertaken enough examination of what was going on in the states
in order to step in to end their discrimination. 2 64
Justice Scalia wrote a separate concurrence in Boerne, with Justice
2 65
John Paul Stevens, defending Smith II against other justices' attacks.

As Justice Scalia wrote, "[w]e held in Smith that the Constitution's Free
Exercise Clause 'does not relieve an individual of the obligation to
comply with a "valid and neutral law of general applicability on the
ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion
prescribes (or proscribes).""' 2 66 Justice Scalia thought the dissenting
justices had not shown that the history of Smith II was wrong.

Although the Court invalidated the application of Congress's
RFRA to the states, it always, as we will see later, upheld the application of RFRA and other pro-religious freedom legislation to the federal
government itself.267
C.

Religions Start to Get More Public Funding

Brennan and Scalia often disagreed once Scalia joined the Court
in 1986. The clearest instance in the church funding area is the differ-

ence between Aguilar and Agostini, the case that overruled Aguilar.
Justice Brennan wrote the 5-4 opinion of the Court in Aguilar v. Felton.268 New York City had paid to send public school teachers into re2 69
ligious schools in order to give their students remedial instruction.
Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court ruled that such use of federal

funds in religious schools violated the Establishment Clause. 27 0 It
raised the same type of divisiveness that Brennan had long worried
about. Aguilar was decided the same day as School District. of Grand
27
Rapids v. Ball, which was also overruled by Agostini v. Felton. 1 In

263. Id. at 520.
264. Id. at 533.
265. Id. at 537 (Stevens, J., concurring).
266. Id.
267. See infra Section IV.D.
268. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
269. Id. at 404.
270. Id. at 414.
271. Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), overruledby Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
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Ball, Justice Brennan wrote a decision concluding that the school district's "Shared Time and Community Education programs," which provided the classes to nonpublic school students at public expense in
classrooms located in and leased from nonpublic schools, had "the 'primary or principal' effect of advancing religion and therefore violated
dictates of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment." 2 72 Justice Brennan still used his own Lemon test to rule against the "Shared
Time" program. 27 3

Twelve years later, the Court overruled Aguilar and Ball in Agostini v. Felton. 274 Agostini was written by Aguilar dissenter Justice

O'Connor. 275 She was joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas. 276 Reversing Aguilar, they ruled that the program did not vi-

olate the Establishment Clause, and significant change in Establishment Clause law entitled petitioners to relief from permanent injunction. 277 The new Court did not believe that students would be

indoctrinated by public teachers instructing in parochial schools. 27 8 So,
we see the newer Catholics on the Court moving away from Justice
Brennan's restrictions on funding religion.
Texas exempted religious periodicals from its sales and use taxes

while funding other publications. 27 9 Justice Brennan's opinion concluded that such a "subsidy exclusively to religious organizations" violated the Establishment Clause through the Lemon test.280 Justices
Scalia and Kennedy dissented, relying on earlier tax and religion precedents to disagree. 281
Justice Brennan also disagreed with Justices Scalia and Kennedy

in the 5-4 decision, Bowen v. Kendrick, which gave funding to religious and other institutions for teenage sexuality counseling, without
expressly stating that the funds could not be used for a religious purpose. 282 Justices Scalia and Kennedy were in the majority that upheld

v.

272. Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985), overruled by Agostini
Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
273. Id.
274. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
275. Id. at 208.
276. Id. at 207.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 240.
279. Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 5 (1989).
280. Id. at 15.
281. Id. at 29 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
282. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
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the legislation, while Justice Brennan dissented. 283 Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion followed Lemon. 284 Justice Kennedy's concur-

rence, joined by Justice Scalia, examined the "pervasively sectarian"
language of the opinion, concluding that the grant in this case was neu-

tral, given to religious and non-religious alike, so the schools' sectarian
nature did not have to be questioned.28s
In contrast, Justice Brennan joined Justice Blackmun's dissent

that concluded the majority had departed from Court precedents and
relied too heavily on the Court's university funding cases, from which
Justice Brennan had dissented. 2 86 The funds granted to the schools were
not limited to previously approved secular textbooks. 287 And the nature
and location of the counseling-maybe in a church-made it possible
for the funding to be used for religious counselors who talk with the
teenagers about a religious subject. 288 Justice Brennan always opposed

the funding of religion, but the newer members of the Court disagreed
with him.
The Court held onto that line between secular and religious until
Justice Thomas directly challenged it in Mitchell v. Helms. 289 Mitchell
overruled Meek and Wolman. 290 Thomas wrote a plurality, joined by
Justices Scalia and Kennedy, upholding federal governmental aid to
private schools. 2 91 He concluded that neutral aid that passes through

parents' hands does not violate the Establishment Clause. 2 92 Justice
O'Connor concurred because she thought the plurality's rule allowing
funding was far too broad:
Reduced to its essentials, the plurality's rule states that government
aid to religious schools does not have the effect of advancing religion so long as the aid is offered on a neutral basis and the aid is
secular in content. The plurality also rejects the distinction between

direct and indirect aid, and holds that the actual diversion of secular
aid by a religious school to the advancement of its religious mission

283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 624-25 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 630-31 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 593.
Id. at 635-36 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
Id. at 835.
Id. at 834.
Id. at 816.
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is permissible. Although the expansive scope of the plurality's rule
is troubling, two specific aspects of the opinion compel me to write

separately. First, the plurality's treatment of neutrality comes close
to assigning that factor singular importance in the future adjudication of Establishment Clause challenges to government school aid
programs. Second, the plurality's approval of actual diversion of
government aid to religious indoctrination is in tension with our
precedents and, in any event, unnecessary to decide the instant
case.

293

Aid has continued to religious schools ever since. Two years later,

Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy joined Chief Justice Rehnquist
in upholding, 5-4, a voucher program giving vouchers to religious
schools in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.2 94 Justice Thomas wrote a concurrence, arguing that the Ohio schools were facing financial emergen-

cies and trying to help students in difficulty. 2 95 Here, as in many other
cases, Thomas questioned whether the Establishment Clause should
apply to the states and specifically whether the Establishment Clause
should be used to "oppose neutral programs of school choice." 296 As
Justice Thomas explained it, "[a]s Frederick Douglass poignantly

noted, 'no greater benefit can be bestowed upon a long benighted people, than giving to them, as we are here earnestly this day endeavoring
to do, the means of an education.' 2 9 7
Both Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas dissented in Locke v.
Davey,

a

case

in

which-perhaps

surprisingly-Chief

Justice

Rehnquist wrote an opinion concluding that it did not violate Free Exercise for Washington to refuse scholarship funding to Joshua Davey
for his devotional theology degree. 2 98 Justice Kennedy joined Chief
Justice Rehnquist's opinion explaining that this program fell into the
"play in the joints" between Establishment and Free Exercise. 299 The
majority wrote that, in contrast to Justice Scalia's reasoning, "training

for religious professions and training for secular professions are not
fungible." 300

293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

Id. at 837-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
Id. at 676 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 680.
Id. at 684.
Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
Id. at 719.
Id. at 721.
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Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented together. 301 Justice Scalia

followed Lukumi Babalu Aye, concluding that the denial of the schol03
arship violated Davey's religious rights. 302 He also cited Everson.3 He

went back to the neutrality and generality requirements of Smith II and
found discrimination on the face of the statute. 304 "The First Amendment, after all, guaranteesfree exercise of religion, and when the State
exacts a financial penalty of almost $3,000 for religious exercise-

whether by tax or by forfeiture of an otherwise available benefit-religious practice is anything but free." 305 Justice Scalia repeated his
Lukumi argument that intent does not matter. 306
Thomas also wrote a separate dissent. "I write separately to note

that, in my view, the study of theology does not necessarily implicate
religious devotion or faith." 30 7 Instead, he said, the state's laws "include
the study of theology from a secular perspective as well as from a religious one." 30 8 Thus, there was a problem in applying the no funding
rule only to those in devotional theology. Thomas continues to criticize
Locke today, as he did in the recent Espinoza case.309
D.

The Justices Accept More Public Monuments

Justice Brennan had joined the Court's 1980 decision, Graham,

310
He
that invalidated a Ten Commandments display in public schools.
reached the same conclusion in County ofAllegheny v. ACLU, this time
dissenting in a 5-4 opinion, with Justices Scalia and Kennedy in the
majority and Justice Brennan in dissent. 311 In Allegheny, the Court

ruled that the display of a creche in a county courthouse was unconstitutional but that the display of a menorah next to a Christmas tree was
constitutional.3 1 2 Justice Brennan opposed both monuments; 31 3 Justices
301. Id. at 726 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 731.
306. Id. at 726.
307. Id. at 734 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
308. Id. at 735.
309. Espinoza v. Mont. Dept. of Revenue, 140 S.Ct. 2246, 2265 (2020) (Thomas, J.,)
("Thus, as I have explained, Locke incorrectly interpreted the Establishment Clause and should
not impact free exercise challenges").
310. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S 39 (1980).
311. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
312. Id.
313. Id. at 637 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Scalia and Kennedy supported both of them. 314 Justice Brennan agreed
that the creche was unconstitutional but dissented about the menorah. 315 He relied upon Justice O'Connor's endorsement test to conclude
that the government had endorsed religion with the menorah. 3 16 Relying on his dissent in Lynch, he insisted that displaying religious objects

violates the separation of church and state:
I continue to believe that the display of an object that "retains a specifically Christian [or other] religious meaning," is incompatible
with the separation of church and state demanded by our Constitution. I therefore agree with the Court that Allegheny County's display of a creche at the county courthouse signals an endorsement of
the Christian faith in violation of the Establishment Clause, and join
Parts HI-A, IV, and V of the Court's opinion. I cannot agree, however, that the city's display of a 45-foot Christmas tree and an 18foot Chanukah menorah at the entrance to the building housing the
mayor's office shows no favoritism towards Christianity, Judaism,
or both. Indeed, I should have thought that the answer as to the first
display supplied the answer to the second. 3 17

Justices Kennedy and Scalia agreed that the menorah could be displayed but dissented on the creche. 3 18 These two justices thought the

decision about the creche "reflects an unjustified hostility toward religion, a hostility inconsistent with our history and our precedents." 319
In Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, the

Court ruled that the Ku Klux Klan is allowed to put up a cross display
without violating the Establishment Clause.32 0 Justice Scalia wrote the
opinion, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas. 321 Justice Thomas
concurred with his memorable language:
Although the Klan might have sought to convey a message with
some religious component, I think that the Klan had a primarily
nonreligious purpose in erecting the cross. The Klan simply has
314. Id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
315. Id.
316. Id. at 640-41 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

Id.

at 637.
Id.
Id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
Id. at 757.
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appropriated one of the most sacred of religious symbols as a symbol of hate. In my mind, this suggests that this case may not have
truly involved the Establishment Clause, although I agree with the
Court's disposition because of the manner in which the case has
come before us. In the end, there may be much less here than meets
the eye. 322
Justice Scalia was always pro-religious monuments. In the last
two Ten Commandments cases, one in a Texas park and the other in a
Kentucky courthouse, Justice Scalia was pro-display. 323 In the Texas
case, Van Orden v. Perry, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined
Chief Justice Rehnquist in the majority, concluding that the Texas Ten

Commandments monument was constitutional. 324 Justice Scalia wrote
a concurring opinion:
I would prefer to reach the same result by adopting an Establishment
Clause jurisprudence that is in accord with our Nation's past and
present practices, and that can be consistently applied-the central

relevant feature of which is that there is nothing unconstitutional in
a State's favoring religion generally, honoring God through public
prayer and acknowledgment, or, in a nonproselytizing manner, ven-

erating the Ten Commandments. 325
Justice Scalia, in dissent, also found Kentucky's McCreary County
courthouse display constitutional. 32 6 He was joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas. 327 As always, they were pro-religious monuments.
Justice Scalia wrote in the context of the 9/11 attack on the United
States:
The next afternoon I was approached by one of the judges from a
European country, who, after extending his profound condolences
for my country's loss, sadly observed: "How I wish that the Head

of State of my country, at a similar time of national tragedy and

322. Id. at 771-72 (Thomas, J., concurring).
323. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); McCreary Cnty v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
324. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 680-81.
325. Id. at 692 (Scalia, J., concurring).
326. McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. 844.
327. Id.

WILLAMETTE LAW REVIEW

204

distress, could conclude his address 'God bless
course absolutely forbidden." 328

[58:163
.'

It is of

Quoting Zorach, Lynch, Marsh, and Schempp, Justice Scalia said "[w]e
are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." 329 Justice Scalia opposed a religion-neutral Constitution. He crit-

icized the "brain-spun 'Lemon test' that embodies the supposed principle of neutrality between religion and irreligion." 330 He reminded
readers that he has often said it is acceptable for government to perform
acts "undertaken with the specific intention of improving the position
of religion." 331 He also insisted that the government can prefer religion

over irreligion. 332
Justice Thomas's concurrence offered his frequently repeated the-

ory that the Establishment Clause should not apply to the states and that
its test requires "actual legal coercion." 333 Justice Thomas wrote that
there was no coercion in Van Orden because the complainant was
simply walking by the monument. 334

Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas often agreed about monuments but sometimes disagreed about prayer.
E. Justice Kennedy Sometimes Opposes Prayer, While Justices
Scalia and Thomas Often Support It
In Lee v. Weisman, Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion for the

Court, concluding that a high school graduation prayer was unconstitutional. 33s Justice Kennedy explained that students felt some strong

desire to attend their graduation, and that the state should not prepare a
prayer for them while they attended. 336 Kennedy was influenced by earlier cases that acknowledged the distinctive pressure faced by schoolchildren at school. 337 Kennedy always liked a coercion test for the Establishment Clause, and concluded that coercion was possible in the
circumstances of the prayer because school officials invited clerical
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

Id. at 885 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 889.
Id. at 890.
Id. at 891.
Id. at 886-910.
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 693 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 694.
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
Id. at 598.
Id. at 596.
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members to attend the graduation and lead the prayer, and students
wanted to attend their graduation.338
Justices Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice
Thomas. 339 Justice Scalia wrote that Justice Kennedy had misunderstood American history, with its "component of an even more
longstanding American tradition of nonsectarian prayer to God at pub-

lic celebrations generally." 340 "The history and tradition of our Nation
are replete with public ceremonies featuring prayers of thanksgiving

and petition." 34 ' Justice Scalia emphasized that students are not really
coerced in such a setting and that they can sit or move their heads differently. And he added:
1 must add one final observation: The Founders of our Republic
knew the fearsome potential of sectarian religious belief to generate
civil dissension and civil strife. And they also knew that nothing,
absolutely nothing, is so inclined to foster among religious believers

of various faiths a toleration-no, an affection-for one another
than voluntarily joining in prayer together, to the God whom they
34
all worship and seek.

Justice Scalia dissented from a certiorari denial in Bunting v. Mellen, in which the Court was asked to review a ruling that a supper prayer
was unconstitutional. 4 3 Justice Scalia thought the question deserved

further study. 344
F.

There Are Always Religious Issues in the Schools

The Court faced repeated cases about religious meetings in public
schools. Justice Brennan joined the 8-1 decision in Widmar v. Vincent,
concluding the University of Missouri had discriminated against Cornerstone's free speech rights by prohibiting it from holding religious
meetings on the university's campus. 341 Justice Brennan joined Justices

Scalia and Kennedy in another 8-1 decision allowing a Christian club

338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.

Id. at 580.
Id. at 631 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 632.
Id. at 633.
Id. at 646.
Bunting v. Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019 (2004).
Id. at 1023 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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to meet after school hours at a public school. 346 Justices Kennedy and
Scalia concurred, while Justice Brennan joined Justice Marshall's concurrence. 347 In neither case did the Court find an Establishment Clause
violation by allowing the clubs to meet on school grounds.
Justice Kennedy explained that he did not want to join all of Justice O'Connor's Mergens argument; 348 he preferred the coercion test of

the Establishment Clause, while Justice O'Connor always backed the
endorsement test. 34 9 For Justice Kennedy, an establishment violation
occurred when the government coerced people into religion; 35 0 for Jus-

'

tice O'Connor, it occurred when the government endorsed religion,
leaving insiders in and outsiders out of religion.3 5
In contrast, Justice Marshall emphasized the many steps the

school must take to avoid endorsement. His concurrence worried that
the Court had not taken the risk of religious endorsement in a religious

school seriously enough: "[S]chools such as Westside must be responsive not only to the broad terms of the Act's coverage, but also to this

Court's mandate that they effectively disassociate themselves from the
religious speech that now may become commonplace in their facili-

ties." 3 2 Justice Marshall's concurrence was consistent with Justice
Brennan's long desire to keep church and state separate.
In Lamb 's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,

the Court allowed a religiously oriented film series on family values
and child rearing to be shown after public school.35 3 The Court ruled it
violated free speech to ban the films, and it was not an establishment
clause violation to allow them. 35 4 Justice Kennedy concurred; Justice
Scalia concurred, with Justice Thomas joining him. 3 5 Both Justice

Kennedy and Justice Scalia agreed that the majority's use of the Lemon
was "unsettling and unnecessary," and both criticized the endorsement
test.3 6 It was in this opinion that Justice Scalia used his famous language about Lemon: "Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that

346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.

Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
Id. at 258-62 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 258-59.
Id. at 250-53.
Id. at 260-62 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 250.
Id. at 270 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
Id.
Id. at 397, 400 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 397.
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repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeat-

edly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school attorneys
of Center Moriches Union Free School District." 357 He also added:
I cannot join for yet another reason: the Court's statement that the
proposed use of the school's facilities is constitutional because
(among other things) it would not signal endorsement of religion in
general. What a strange notion, that a Constitution which itselfgives

"religion in general" preferential treatment (I refer to the Free Exercise Clause) forbids endorsement of religion in general. The attorney general of New York not only agrees with that strange notion,
he has an explanation for it: "Religious advocacy," he writes,

"serves the community only in the eyes of its adherents and yields
a benefit only to those who already believe." That was not the view
of those who adopted our Constitution, who believed that the public
virtues inculcated by religion are a public good. It suffices to point

out that during the summer of 1789, when it was in the process of
drafting the First Amendment, Congress enacted the Northwest Territory Ordinance that the Confederation Congress had adopted in
1787-Article III of which provides: "Religion, morality, and
knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness

ofmankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged." Unsurprisingly, then, indifference to "religion in gen-

eral" is not what our cases, both old and recent, demand. 358
In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, Justices Scalia and Thomas joined Justice Kennedy's 5-4 opinion, holding that Rosenberger's newspaper, Wide Awake: A Christian
Perspective at the University of Virginia, must receive the same funding as secular student-run publications. 359 Justice Kennedy wrote that

Rosenberger had suffered from viewpoint discrimination: "That course
of action was a denial of the right of free speech and would risk fostering a pervasive bias or hostility to religion, which could undermine the
very neutrality the Establishment Clause requires." 360 Justice Thomas's

concurrence identified historical errors in the dissent because it did not
recognize the Nation's history of "allowing religious adherents to

357.
358.
359.
360.

Id. at 398.
Id. at 400 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
Id. at 845-46.
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participate on equal terms in neutral government programs," and he rejected any conclusion that the government "must actively discriminate
against religion." 36 1 "The Clause does not compel the exclusion of religious groups from government benefits programs that are generally

available to a broad class of participants." 362
In Good News Club v. Milford Central School, Justice Thomas
wrote the opinion and Justice Scalia concurred, again agreeing that,

following Widmar and Lamb's Chapel, the school could not bar a
Christian club-the Good News Club-from meeting after school
hours. 363 Thomas argued that Good News's free speech would be violated if it were banned and that no establishment of religion was set up
by having Good News at the School.
The Court dismissed a student's challenge to a policy requiring a

teacher-led recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance. 364 Justice Kennedy
joined Justice Stevens in concluding that the student's father did not
have standing to bring the lawsuit. 365 Justice Scalia did not take part in
the case. Justice Thomas concurred, employing his usual criticism of
the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, explaining that the
Court of Appeals had misread Lee v. Weisman, which Justice Thomas

believed was wrongly decided anyway.3 66 Justice Thomas believed
Newdow had standing; the Justice would have used the case to redo the
Establishment Clause. 367 First, as always, it would not be applied to the
states. 368 Justice Thomas thought the pledge policy was constitutional

as it did not violate Free Exercise either:
Through the Pledge policy, the State has not created or maintained

any religious establishment, and neither has it granted government
authority to an existing religion. The Pledge policy does not expose
anyone to the legal coercion associated with an established religion.
Further, no other free-exercise rights are at issue. It follows that religious liberty rights are not in question and that the Pledge policy

fully comports with the Constitution.369

361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.

Id. at 852-53 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 861.
Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
Id. at 3.
Id. at 18-49 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 54.
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In Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v. Grumet, Justice Kennedy was with the majority saying the government

could not set up a school district made for the Satmar Hasidim. 370 Justice Kennedy joined Justice Souter's opinion saying that the incorpo-

rated religious enclave violates the Establishment Clause. 37' Justices
Scalia and Thomas dissented. 372 In Justice Scalia's memorable language:
The Court today finds that the Powers That Be, up in Albany, have
conspired to effect an establishment of the Satmar Hasidim. I do not
know who would be more surprised at this discovery: the Founders
of our Nation or Grand Rebbe Joel Teitelbaum, founder of the
Satmar. The Grand Rebbe would be astounded to learn that after
escaping brutal persecution and coming to America with the modest
hope of religious toleration for their ascetic form of Judaism, the
Satmar had become so powerful, so closely allied with Mammon,
as to have become an "establishment" of the Empire State. And the
Founding Fathers would be astonished to find that the Establishment Clause-which they designed "to insure that no one powerful
sect or combination of sects could use political or governmental
power to punish dissenters," Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 319,

72 S.Ct. 679, 686, 96 L.Ed. 954 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting)-has
been employed to prohibit characteristically and admirably American accommodation of the religious practices (or more precisely,

cultural peculiarities) of a tiny minority sect. I, however, am not
surprised. Once this Court has abandoned text and history as guides,
nothing prevents it from calling religious toleration the establish373
ment of religion.

Justices Scalia and Brennan disagreed again about the place of
creation-science in the public schools in Edwards v. Aguillard.374 Justice Brennan wrote the Lemon-based majority opinion, concluding: (1)
the Act [allowing creation science] serves no identified secular purpose; and (2) the Act has as its primary purpose the promotion of a

particular religious belief and is thus unconstitutional. 375 Justice Brennan cited Epperson v. Arkansas-a case from when Brennan was the
370. Bd. of Edu. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
371. Id. at 689.
372. Id. at 732 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
373. Id. at 732.
374. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
375. Id. at 585, 593.
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only Catholic on the Court-agreeing with the Court's earlier unanimous decision that the state could not prohibit a teacher from teaching
evolution. 376 He followed a similar analysis about the religious and the
secular in Aguillard.377 Scalia dissented in Aguillard, however. 37 8 He
was always a critic of Lemon. As he wrote, "[a]bandoning Lemon's
purpose test-a test which exacerbates the tension between the Free

Exercise and Establishment Clauses, has no basis in the language or
history of the Amendment, and, as today's decision shows, has wonderfully flexible consequences-would be a good place to start." 379
Justice Scalia, with Justice Thomas, dissented from the Court's
denial of certiorari in Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education v.

Freiler,a case about a warning to students about learning evolution. 380
Justice Scalia took on the Lemon test and suggested this could be a
good time to review it.38' He also wrote:
In view of the fact that the disclaimer merely reminds students of
their right to form their own beliefs on the subject, or to maintain
beliefs taught by their parents- not to mention the fact that the theory of evolution is the only theory actually taught in the lesson that
follows the disclaimer-there is "no realistic danger that the community would think that the [School Board] was endorsing religion
or any particular creed, and any benefit to religion or to the Church
would have been no more than incidental." 382

G.

One Small Case ofDiscrimination, With More to Follow Later

Religious organizations are frequently allowed to discriminate.
For example, engineer Arthur Frank Mayson filed a religious discrim-

ination lawsuit against the Deseret Gymnasium, which was run by the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. 38 3 Mayson did not qualify

376. See Edwards, 482 U.S. 578, 582, 585, 590. 593-95 (citing Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97 (1968)).
377. Id.
378. Id. at 610.
379. Id. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
380. Tangipahoa Par. Bd. of Educ. v. Freiler, 530 U.S. 1251 (mem.) (2000).
381. Id. at 1253 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
382. Id. at 1254.
383. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).

WHA T DID THOSE SIXTEEN JUSTICES SAY?

2022]

211

for a religious certificate allowing him to participate in the church's
services. 384 His job was non-religious. 385
The Court unanimously upheld an exemption for the church from

a claim for religious discrimination. 386 Justice Scalia joined Justice
White's opinion upholding the exemption from the anti-discrimination
laws. 387 The majority applied the Lemon test, even though the employee's activities were secular.3 88 The Court allowed religious employers to choose employees for nonreligious jobs based on their reli390
gion. 389 Justice Scalia joined Justice White's majority opinion.

Justice Brennan concurred, arguing that the most relevant issue was
that a nonprofit organization was involved. 39' "I believe that the particular character of nonprofit activity makes inappropriate a case-by-case
determination whether its nature is religious or secular." 392 "I believe
that a categorical exemption for such enterprises appropriately balances
these competing concerns."393 Therefore, he concurred with the majority's rule that Deseret had an automatic exemption from Title VII's

prohibition on religious discrimination.
Later administrations would decide more cases allowing discrimination by religious organizations.
IV. THE NEXT THREE JUSTICES ARE CATHOLIC: CHIEF JUSTICE
ROBERTS (2005) AND JUSTICE ALITO (2006) FROM PRESIDENT GEORGE
W. BUSH, FOLLOWED BY JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR (2009) FROM PRESIDENT
OBAMA

The next three Justices were Catholics. Chief Justice John Roberts

and Justice Samuel Alito were both nominated by the second President
Bush. 394 Chief Justice Roberts took his seat in 2005, and Justice Alito

in 2006.395 Justice Sonia Sotomayor was nominated by President

384.
385.
386.
387.
388..
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.

Id. at 330-31.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 328.
Id. at 335.
Id.
Id. at 328.
Id. at 340 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 340.
Id. at 345-46.
See Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 60.
See Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 60.

WILLAMETTE LAW REVIEW

212

[58:163

Obama and took her seat in 2009.396 They, too, changed the direction
of the Court, again moving it in a direction more favorable to religion.
Over time, Justice Sotomayor moved in a different direction than her
colleagues on those questions.
A.

Even More Public Monuments

The Court continued ruling on the constitutionality of government
religious monuments. Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum turned

out to be a speech case, not a religion case. 397 Summum petitioners
asked the local government to include their monument along with the
Ten Commandments monument in Pioneer Park, Utah. 398 Their stone

monument contains the Seven Aphorisms of Summum. 399 Justice Alito,
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas, wrote the opinion denying Summum's request. 40 Justice
Scalia filed a concurring opinion with Justice Thomas.4 0 ' There were

no dissents. The Court ruled under the Free Speech Clause that the
monuments were government speech, and therefore the government
did not have to include a monument it did not want.4 02 Because it was

not a forum for private speech, the government did not violate the free
speech rights of Summum. 4 03
Justices Scalia and Thomas, while joining the Court's free speech

opinion, also noted that the case had been litigated "in the shadow" of
the Establishment Clause.4 04 Justice Scalia made clear that they should
not be afraid of establishment because Van Orden had settled that the
Establishment Clause was not violated by Texas's Ten Commandments
monument.4 05 Justice Scalia cited Breyer's Van Orden concurrence to
show that the Utah monument had a secular message. 406 "The city can
safely exhale. Its residents and visitors can now return to enjoying Pi-

oneer Park's wishing well, its historic granary-and, yes, even its Ten

396.
397.
398.
399.

400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.

See Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 60.
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
Id. at 465.
Id.
Id. at 464-81.
Id. at 482 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 481.
Id.
Id. at 482.
Id.
Id. at 483
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Commandments monument-without fear that they are complicit in an

establishment of religion." 407
A later monument case involved a Latin cross in the Mojave National Preserve monument to World War I soldiers. 408 The government

transferred the land to private parties in order to avoid violating the
Establishment Clause. 409 The lower courts stopped the transfer. 4 10 Jus-

tice Kennedy wrote the opinion of the Court.4 " Chief Justice Roberts,
Justice Alito, and Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred
separately. 412 Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Sotomayor, dissented.4

13

Justice Kennedy reversed the district court's ruling, ordering it to
consider the history and context of the transfer more properly. 4 14 He
reminded readers, "[a]lthough certainly a Christian symbol, the cross
415
was not emplaced on Sunrise Rock to promote a Christian message."

The district court needed to follow the full history and context of the
monument. The Court later upheld the transfer of the cross to private
land.4 1 6

Chief Justice Roberts wrote a brief concurrence:
At oral argument, respondent's counsel stated that it "likely would
be consistent with the injunction" for the Government to tear down
the cross, sell the land to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and return

the cross to them, with the VFW immediately raising the cross
again. I do not see how it can make a difference for the Government
to skip that empty ritual and do what Congress told it to do-sell
the land with the cross on it. "The Constitution deals with substance,
not shadows."4 17

407. Id.
408. Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (2010).
409. Id. at 705-11.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 705.
412. Id. at 723 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
413. Id. at 735 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
414. Id. at 722.
415. Id. at 715.
416. See Thomas Curwen, Ruling Will Allow Mojave Desert Outcropping to Again Feature a Cross, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2012, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/Iocal/la-xpm2012-apr-25-la-me-mojave-cross-20120425-story.html.
417. Salazar, 559 U.S.700 at 723 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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Justice Alito joined Justice Kennedy's opinion, but, instead of remanding the case, would have ruled that the transfer could be implemented. Alito thought Congress's action was "true to the spirit of practical accommodation that has made the United States a Nation of
unparalleled pluralism and religious tolerance." 4 18 Justices Scalia and
Thomas ruled that Frank Buono did not have standing to bring the
suit.419 This transfer kept the cross from being on government property

as Buono had desired.
Justice Stevens's dissent was joined by Justice Sotomayor: "I certainly agree that the Nation should memorialize the service of those
who fought and died in World War I, but it cannot lawfully do so by
continued endorsement of a starkly sectarian message." 420 Justice Sotomayor seems to be the only Catholic who picked up Justice Brennan's
concern about government religious monuments.

In another case, Justice Thomas dissented from the denial of certiorari in Utah Highway PatrolAssociation v. American Atheists, Inc.,

where he again criticized the "shambles" of the Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. 4 2 1 The Tenth Circuit had said that memorializations of police officers with white crosses endorsed Christianity.422 Because Justice Thomas did not think that action violated the Establishment Clause, he would have granted certiorari.
B.

Another Schools Case
The Court was still considering cases about student groups in

schools, this time a university. The Hastings College of Law at the University of California had a non-discrimination policy that required
school groups to admit members without sexual orientation discrimination. 423 The Christian Legal Society did not want to include LGBTQ
members. 424 In a 5-4 decision, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices
Kennedy and Sotomayor, concluded that the school's plan did not violate the First Amendment. 425 Justice Kennedy concurred. 4 26 The
418. Id. at 723 (Alito, J., concurring).
419. Id. at 729.
420. Id. at 735.
421. Utah Highway Patrol Ass'n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 565 U.S. 994 (2011) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (denying petition for Writ of Certiorari).
422. Am, Atheists, Inc. v, Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1164 (10th Cir. 2011).
423. Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 667-68 (2010).
424. Id. at 672.
425. Id. at 698.
426. Id. at 793 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

WHAT DID THOSE SIXTEEN JUSTICES SAY?

2022]

majority ruled the plan was reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.4

215
27

Jus-

tice Alito wrote a dissent joined by Justices Roberts, Scalia, and
Thomas.42 8
Justice Kennedy's concurrence concluded the Hastings case was
not like Rosenberger because Hastings's rule was content neutral,
"appl[ying] equally to all groups and views," and there was no desire

to discriminate. 4 29 In dissent, Justice Alito complained that the decision
rested on a principle of "no freedom for expression that offends pre-

vailing standards of political correctness in our country's institutions
of higher learning." 4 30 The Catholics disagreed about what was dis-

criminatory and what was neutral.
C.

More Prayer

Remember that Justice Brennan dissented in 1983 in the Marsh
case; he ruled that legislative prayer was unconstitutional.4 3 1 Thereafter, the Marsh majority was followed as setting a special Establishment
Clause rule for legislative prayer. That rule emphasized, not the long
list of Establishment Clause tests (Lemon, endorsement, coercion, e.g.),
but a test that focused on history. 432 Marsh said legislative prayer was

constitutional because it had happened in early American history. 4 33
The Court reconsidered Marsh in Town of Greece, New York v.

Galloway, where the Second Circuit had ruled that Greece's predominantly Christian prayer practice at its town meetings was unconstitutional, relying on other court tests and thinking legislative prayer had
to be non-sectarian. 4 34 In the Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy wrote
the majority opinion upholding Greece's prayer practice.4 3 5 Chief Jus-

tice Roberts and Justice Alito joined his opinion in full, and Justices
Scalia and Thomas joined most of it. 436 As usual, they disagreed about
coercion. Justice Alito wrote a concurrence, joined by Justice Scalia. 437

427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.

Id. at 691-97.
Id. at 706 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id at 704 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 706 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 796-97 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 786-94.
Id.
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014).
Id. at 569-591.
Id. at 569.
Id. at 592-604 (Alito, J., concurring).
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Justice Thomas filed a concurrence; Justice Scalia joined part of it. 438
Justice Sotomayor joined Justice Kagan's dissenting opinion. 4 39 The
opinion gave a big boost to governmental prayer.44 0

Justice Alito argued that "Marsh reflected the original understanding of the First Amendment."44 1 "It is virtually inconceivable that the
First Congress, having appointed chaplains whose responsibilities

prominently included the delivery of prayers at the beginning of each
daily session, thought that this practice was inconsistent with the Establishment Clause."" 2 Justice Thomas wrote separately in order to
emphasize his now-common theme that the Establishment Clause is not
applied to state governments. 44 3 Justice Scalia did not join that part of
Justice Thomas's opinion. He did join Justice Thomas in agreeing that
Greece's prayers were not coercive and therefore were constitu-

tional.44
Justice Sotomayor joined Justice Kagan's dissent arguing that

there should have been a diverse array of speakers to match the diversity of the United States, not just predominantly Christian prayers.4 5 It
is interesting, given the long history of the Court, that no Justice wrote
a strict separationist argument in this case. Either predominantly Christian prayer (majority) or a range of prayers (dissent). No one really argued Brennan's position in the Marsh dissent that legislative prayer
was simply unconstitutional.

Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented from a certiorari denial in
Elmbrook School District v. Doe.446 The Seventh Circuit had ruled a

school could not use a church for its graduation under the endorsement
test. 447 Scalia wrote that, post-Town of Greece, endorsement is gone,

so the test should be reviewed. 448 The two dissenters wrote there was
not any coerced religious activity, again a sign that there was no Establishment violation.44

438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.

9

Id. at 604-610 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 610 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014).
Id. at 602 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 602-03
Id. at 604 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 604-10.
Id. at 610 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Elmbrook Sch. Dist. V. Doe, 573 U.S. 922 (2014).
Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2012).
Elmbrook Sch. Dist. V. Doe, 573 U.S. 922, 922-26 (2014).
Id.
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D. Free Exercise, RFRA, andRLUIPA
The Court continued to debate free exercise and its replacements:
RFRA and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act

(RLUIPA).
Chief Justice Roberts wrote a unanimous decision, lacking Alito,
who was not involved in the case, in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita
Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal.4 50 In that case, the religious group

wanted to use hoasca tea, which contains a drug restricted in the Controlled Substances Act.4' The government had argued that it had a
compelling interest to apply the Act uniformly, but the Court rejected
that position, concluding that the government had not established a
compelling interest "in barring the UDV's sacramental use of
hoasca."4 52 RFRA provided strict scrutiny when Smith II did not. The
Court has been happy to enforce that.

Justice Thomas dissented from the certiorari denial in Swanner v.
Anchorage EqualRights Commission, which involved a successful discrimination suit against a residential property owner who refused to
rent to unmarried couples. 45 3 As Justice Thomas wrote, "I would grant
certiorari to resolve whether, under RFRA, an interest in preventing

discrimination based on marital status is sufficiently 'compelling' that
respondent may substantially burden petitioner's exercise of religion." 454
The Court unanimously held RLUIPA constitutional in Cutter v.
Wilkinson in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg.45 5 Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas joined her.4 56 Justice Thomas's concurrence, for him-

self only, spoke again about the historical meaning of the Establishment
Clause, which, on his non-federalism account, would lead to the same
conclusion as the majority but for different reasons. 45 7
Justice Alito delivered a unanimous decision for prisoner Gregory

Holt in Holt v. Hobbs, ruling that Holt should be allowed to have his
one-half inch beard even though prison regulations allowed one-quarter

450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.

Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
Id. at 423.
Id. at 439.
Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rts. Comm'n, 513 U.S. 979 (1994).
Id. at 461 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
Id.
Id. at 726 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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inch beards. 458 This was a RLUIPA victory for the prisoner. The Court
doubted whether the prison's compelling interest against contraband
was met and ruled that the prison had not shown its policy was the least
restrictive means. 459 Justice Sotomayor joined Justice Ginsburg's con-

currence as well as writing her own. 4 60 In her own concurrence, she
said that the Department "offered little more than unsupported asserrequested religious accomtions in defense of its refusal of petitioner's
46
modation. RLUIPA requires more."

1

In an earlier case, the justices disagreed about state sovereign immunity in RLUIPA cases. 462 Justice Thomas's opinion for the Court,
joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and

Justice Alito, concluded that RLUIPA did not waive states' sovereign
immunity, and so the lawsuit against Texas was barred. 463 Justice Sotomayor's dissent thought that "monetary damages are 'appropriate re-

lief is, in my view, self-evident," and would have allowed the case to
proceed.4 64
E.

Flast and Standing

Standing decides whose case gets into court. In 1968, in Flastv.
Cohen, Justice Brennan joined the Flastmajority in allowing a tax challenge to an Establishment Clause violation by the government. 4 65 Even

back in Justice Brennan's era, Justice Brennan had protested the narrowing of Flastto exclude cases that should have been heard. 4 66 In Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of

Church and State, Inc., Chief Justice Rehnquist ruled that Americans
United did not have standing to bring the case. 467 Justice Brennan dissented that the Court should have been faithful to Flastand talked about
the Establishment Clause instead of standing:

458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
(Brennan,
and State,
467.

Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (2015).
Id.
Id. at 370 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277 (2011).
Id. at 293.
Id. at 293 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the war, 418 U.S. 208, 237-38 (1974)
J., dissenting); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 513 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Valley Forge ChristianColl., 454 U.S. 464.
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Plainly hostile to the Framers' understanding of the Establishment
Clause, and Flast's enforcement of that understanding, the Court
vents that hostility under the guise of standing, "to slam the courthouse door against plaintiffs who [as the Framers intended] are entitled to full consideration of their [Establishment Clause] claims on
the merits."468
The battle against Flast continued post-Brennan. In Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., the five Catholics-Chief Justice
Roberts, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas and Justice

Alito-were the majority five who denied the taxpayers standing to
challenge President George W. Bush's faith-based offices that gave religious groups federal support.4 69 Justice Alito wrote the opinion,

joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy. 4 70 Justice Kennedy concurred. 4 7' Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, con-

curred. 472 Justice Alito's opinion said Flastwas too broadly construed,
and it has to be looked at narrowly in this challenge to executive ac47 4
tion. 473 Justices Alito and Kennedy agreed on narrowing Flast. Jus-

tice Scalia said Flast should be overruled. 475 None of them favored
Flast. The dissenting non-Catholic justices- Justices Souter, Stevens,

Ginsburg, and Breyer-would have allowed the case to proceed. 4 76
A few years later, another Flast case had the same five Catholics
in the majority and Sotomayor in the dissent. In Arizona Christian
School Tuition Organizationv. Winn, Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas,

and Justice Alito, in a case where taxpayers challenged Arizona's tuition tax credit, which allowed Arizonans who contributed to student
tuition organizations to receive credit for their contributions. 4 77 Justice
Kennedy concluded the taxpayers lacked standing to challenge the
act. 4 78 Justice Scalia was joined in a concurrence by Justice Thomas

and argued that Flast v. Cohen had created an unnecessary exception
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.

Id. at 513 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007).
Id. at 592.
Id. at 615 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 618 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 592-615.
Id. at 615-18 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 618-37 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 637-43 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125 (2011).
Id. at 146.
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that gave taxpayers standing in the Establishment Clause area.479 Justice Scalia again thought Flast should be abandoned, as he had also
argued in his concurrence in Hein v. Freedomfrom Religion Foundation, Inc.48 0

Justice Sotomayor joined the dissenters and would have allowed
the case to proceed. Justice Brennan had joined Chief Justice Warren's
opinion in the 1968 Flast case. 4 81 The dissenters with Justice Sotomayor defended it: "Today, the Court breaks from this precedent by
refusing to hear taxpayers' claims that the government has unconstitutionally subsidized religion through its tax system."48 2 The dissent con-

tinued:
"The Court's opinion thus offers a roadmap-more truly, just a one-

step instruction-to any government that wishes to insulate its financing of religious activity from legal challenge. Structure the
funding as a tax expenditure, and Flast will not stand in the way.
No taxpayer will have standing to object."4 83

Justice Alito, joined by Justices Roberts and Thomas, dissented
from certiorari denial in Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, which had upheld

regulations requiring pharmacists to fulfill prescriptions. 484 "If this is a
sign of how religious liberty claims will be treated in the years ahead,
those who value religious freedom have cause for great concern ....

Violate your sincerely held religious beliefs or get out of the pharmacy
business."485 The Justices thought this case was similar to Lukumi.4 86
Many of the justices are waiting for the chance to say something negative about Smith.
The current Court got the chance to comment on Smith v. Sherbert
in Fulton v. Philadelphia.487 Smith is still alive, as we will discuss be-

low. 4 88 But we have to wonder about Smith 's precedential strength.

479. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
480. Hein, 551 U.S. 587 (2007).
481. Flast, 392 U.S. 83.
482. Ariz. ChristianSch. Tuition Org., 563 U.S. at 147 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
483. Id. at 168.
484. Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct.
2433 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting).
485. Stormans, Inc., 136 S.Ct. at 2433-34 (Alito, J., dissenting).
486. Id. at 2436-37.
487. Fulton v. Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021).
488. See infra text accompanying notes 689-711.

2022]

F.

WHAT DID THOSE SIXTEEN JUSTICES SAY?

221

There is Religious Freedom to Discriminate

In 2012, a unanimous Supreme Court joined most of the lower
courts in recognizing the ministerial exception, which is a First Amend-

ment affirmative defense identified by the Court that keeps lawsuits by
ministers against their employers out of court. 4 89 Chief Justice Roberts
wrote the opinion for the Court, explaining why Cheryl Perich, a Lu-

theran school teacher, qualified as a minister, and her disabilities discrimination lawsuit was thus barred by the First Amendment.4 90 Justice
Thomas filed a concurring opinion, arguing that the courts should al49
ways defer to the employer's characterization of who is a minister. 1
Justice Alito wrote a concurrence complaining about the confusion

brought on by the word "minister" and expanding the exemption to
cover anyone who performed religious functions: "[C]ourts should fo-

cus on the function performed by persons who work for religious bodies."4 92 This case was one of the biggest recent wins for religious freedom, allowing religious organizations to disobey any of the
antidiscrimination laws without the facts ever being litigated.
Eight years later, with a different set of justices, Justice Alito expanded the ministerial exemption to include teachers at Catholic
schools. 493 Two of those justices were nominated by President Trump,

who wound up adding three Catholic justices to the Court. 494 Justice

Sotomayor dissented in Morrissey-Berru, arguing that the Court had

closed the courts to thousands of teachers and other employees of religious organizations. 4 95
In Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Juan, Puerto Rico v.
Acevedo Feliciano, a per curiam opinion remanded the case for more
proceedings. 4 96 Justice Alito's concurrence, joined by Justice Thomas,

questioned the Puerto Rico court's conclusion that the Catholic Church

489. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012).
490. Id. at 196.
491. Id. at 196-206 (Thomas, J., concurring).
492. Id. at 198 (Alito, J., concurring).
493. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020).
494. Ronald Brownstein, How Conservative Catholics Became Supreme on GOP's Court,
CNN: FAULT LtNES (Sept. 27, 2020, 4:39 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/27/politics/conservative-catholics-gop-supreme-court/index.html.
495. Our Lady of GuadalupeSch., 140 S. Ct. at 2076.
496. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Juan v. Acevedo Feliciano, 140 S. Ct. 696
(2020) (per curiam).
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was a single legal entity.4 97 He also identified questions that may merit
the Court's review:
(1) the degree to which the First Amendment permits civil authorities to question a religious body's own understanding of its structure

and the relationship between associated entities and (2) whether,
and if so to what degree, the First Amendment places limits on rules
on civil liability that seriously threaten the right of Americans to the
free exercise of religion as members of a religious body. 49 8
Some justices are eager to protect the religious freedom of organiza-

tions to do what they choose.
V.

THREE CATHOLICS-JUSTICE GORSUCH (2017), JUSTICE

KAVANAUGH (2018) AND JUSTICE BARRETT (2020)-WERE CHOSEN
BY PRESIDENT TRUMP FOR THE COURT

President Trump named three Catholics to the Supreme Court of
the United States. Justice Neil Gorsuch, Justice Brett Kavanaugh, and
Justice Amy Coney Barrett were all nominated by President Trump. 499

Justice Gorsuch replaced the deceased Justice Scalia in 2017 and Justice Kavanaugh replaced the retired Justice Kennedy in 2018.500 Justice
Amy Coney Barrett joined the Court in November 2020 after the death
of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. 50 1Justice Gorsuch is currently an Epis-

copalian but is included in this essay because he was raised Catholic.s0 2
A.

Even More Funding
As noted earlier in this paper, Justice Thomas long supported

funding to religious organizations, as in his dissent from denying certiorari in Columbia Union College v. Clarke.5 03 "We should take this

opportunity to scrap the 'pervasively sectarian' test and reaffirm that
the Constitution requires, at a minimum, neutrality not hostility toward

497. Id. at 701-02 (Alito, J., concurring)..
498. Id. at 702.
499. See Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 60.
500. See Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 60.
501. See Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 60.
502. Ronald Brownstein, How ConservativeCatholics Became Supreme on GOP's Court,
CNN: FAULT LINES (Sept. 27, 2020, 4:39 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/27/politics/conservative-catholics-gop-supreme-court/index.html.
503. Columbia Union Coll. v. Clarke, 159 F.3d 151 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S.
1013 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting); supra Section III.C.
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religion." 0 4 Although many of the colleges participating in the program in Clarke were affiliated with religious institutions, Maryland
deemed Columbia Union College, a private liberal arts college affiliated with the Seventh-day Adventist Church, "'too religious' to participate." 05 According to Justice Thomas:
We invented the "pervasively sectarian" test as a way to distinguish
between schools that carefully segregate religious and secular activities and schools that consider their religious and educational
missions indivisible and therefore require religion to permeate all
activities. In my view, the "pervasively sectarian" test rests upon
two assumptions that cannot be squared with our more recent juris-

prudence. The first of these assumptions is that the Establishment
Clause prohibits government funds from ever benefiting, either directly or indirectly, "religious" activities. The other is that any institution that takes religion seriously cannot be trusted to observe
this prohibition.50

6

A year later, Justice Thomas wrote the plurality opinion, joined by
Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy, in Mitchell v. Helms, upholding
federal governmental aid to private schools. 507 He concluded that neu-

tral aid that passes through parents' hands does not violate the Establishment Clause. 50 8 Justice O'Connor concurred because she thought
the plurality's rule allowing funding was too broad. 509
As noted at the beginning of this essay, the current Court, with

Justice Gorsuch first and later Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett, added
to the funding available to religious schools in three opinions: Trinity
Lutheran, Espinoza, and Carson.510 The first two cases involved state
Blaine amendments."' The original Blaine amendment was proposed

as an amendment to the federal Constitution that would have banned

504. Columbia Union Coll., 527 U.S. at 1014 (emphasis in original).
505. Id. at 1013.
506. Id.
507. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
508. Id. at 816.
509. Id. at 837 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
510. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017); Espinoza v.
Mont. Dep't of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020); Carson as next friend of O. C. v. Makin, 142
S. Ct. 1987 (2022).
511. Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2258-59; Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, 137 S. Ct.
at 2018.
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aid to religious organizations, including religious schools.5 1 2 The federal amendment did not pass.51 3 Many states, however, passed their
own constitutional amendments that banned such aid. Currently 37
states have Blaine amendments. 1 4
Missouri had such an amendment, and because of that amendment
the state refused to allow a church school participation in a project that
allowed recipients to replace their pea gravel with rubber through Missouri's Scrap Tire program.1 5 The Missouri amendment banned such

aid. The 7-2 opinion was written by Chief Justice Roberts, who was
joined in full by Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Kagan, and, for all except
footnote three, by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch. 516 Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment.5 17 The majority ruled that the Free Exercise
Clause was violated by the amendment's refusal to give aid to religions. 5 18 Justices Thomas and Gorsuch made a point of joining Chief
Justice Roberts' opinion, except for footnote three, which stated, "this
case involves express discrimination based on religious identity with
respect to playground resurfacing. We do not address religious uses of
funding or other forms of discrimination."5 19 Justice Thomas filed a

concurrence joined by Justice Gorsuch, and Justice Gorsuch filed a
'

concurrence joined by Justice Thomas.52 0 Justice Sotomayor wrote the
dissent, joined by Justice Ginsburg.5 2
Chief Justice Roberts's opinion concluded the amendment violated free exercise, because it "discriminates against otherwise eligible

recipients by disqualifying them from a public benefit solely because
of their religious character."5 2 2 Chief Justice Roberts concluded the
program required Trinity Lutheran to "renounce its religious character

in order to participate in an otherwise generally available public benefit

512. Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2268 (Alito, J. concurring).
513. Id.
514. See Blaine Amendments in State Constitutions, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Blaine_amendments_in_state_constitutions (last visited June 12, 2022).
515. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, 137 S. Ct. at 2017.
516. Id. at 2016, 2025.
517. Id. at 2026 (Breyer, J., concurring).
518. Id. at 2024.
519. Id. at 2024 n. 3.
520. Id. at 2025-27 (Thomas, J., concurring in part).
521. Id. at 2027 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
522. Id. at 2021.
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Applying strict scrutiny, Chief Justice Roberts decided

the State's action was unconstitutional.5 2 4
Presumably anticipating future cases, Justices Thomas and Gor-

such refused to join footnote three. Justice Thomas also noted his continued disagreement with Locke v. Davey, which in his view had al-

lowed states to discriminate against religion by refusing funding to
Joshua Davey, a pastoral theology student.52 5 But because the majority
had interpreted Locke narrowly, and the parties had not asked for Locke

to be reconsidered, 52 6 he joined the opinion, except for footnote three.
Justice Gorsuch questioned a distinction that continued to interest
him, although not the majority, namely the difference between religious status and religious use. Justice Gorsuch thought status and use
were very similar: "I don't see why it should matter whether we describe that benefit, say, as closed to Lutherans (status) or closed to people who do Lutheran things (use). It is free exercise either way." 52 7 Jus-

tice Gorsuch also explained that he refused to join footnote three
because some might think it means that the case was limited to playground resurfacing only, and "the general principles here do not permit
discrimination against religious exercise-whether on the playground
or anywhere else." 5 28
Justice Sotomayor dissented, stating that "the stakes are higher"

in the case than the majority believed. 529 She thought the decision
5 30
"jeopardize[d] the government's ability to remain secular[:]"

This case is about nothing less than the relationship between reli-

gious institutions and the civil government-that is, between church
and state. The Court today profoundly changes that relationship by
holding, for the first time, that the Constitution requires the government to provide public funds directly to a church. Its decision slights
both our precedents and our history, and its reasoning weakens this
country's longstanding commitment to a separation of church and

state beneficial to both. 531

523.
524.
525.
526.
527.
528.
529.
530.
531.

Id. at 2024.
Id. at 2024.
Id. at 2025-26 (Thomas, J., concurring in part).
Id.
Id. at 2026 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 2041 (Sotomayor, J., disscnting).
Id.
Id. at 2027.

226

WILLAMETTE LAW REVIEW

[58:163

Justice Sotomayor thought "[i]f this separation means anything, it
means that the government cannot, or at the very least need not, tax its
citizens and turn that money over to houses of worship."5 32 Justice Sotomayor agreed with Justice Brennan's spirit of the government not
funding religion in this dissent.
The next case arrived in Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue,

where five Catholic Supreme Court Justices-Chief Justice Roberts,
Justice Thomas, Justice Alito, Justice Gorsuch, and now Justice Brett
Kavanaugh-modified the Court's jurisprudence of the First Amendment's Religion Clauses over four dissents from Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. 533 The Court ruled that, if a private

school gets state aid, religious schools must also receive it.534 The religious schools have a free-exercise right to such aid. 535 The five justices

agreed that the Establishment Clause does not block aid to religious
schools.
The concurrences added additional arguments. Justice Thomas,
now joined by Justice Gorsuch, said the Establishment Clause does not
apply to the states, who should in fact be free to choose whatever religion they want. 536 Justice Thomas repeated his criticism of the Lemon

test and Justice O'Connor's endorsement test.537 Justice Thomas, citing
his joining of Justice Alito's concurrence on denying certiorari in Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist. (which Justices Gorsuch and Ka-

vanaugh also joined), thought that the Court's misguided tests had led
the courts to the "'remarkable' suggestion 'that even while off duty, a
teacher or coach cannot engage in any outward manifestation of religious faith. "'538 And Justice Thomas complained that the Free Exercise
Clause remained on the "lowest rung of the Court's ladder of rights."5 39
Justice Gorsuch repeated his argument that both status and use are pro-

tected by the Free Exercise Clause. 540 Justice Alito emphasized that the

532. Id. at 2041.
533. Espinoza v. Mont. Dept. of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020).
534. Id. at 2262-63.
535. Id.
536. Id. at 2063.
537. Id. at 2063-65 (Thomas, J., concurring).
538. Id. at 2265 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 139
S. Ct. 634, 637 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring)). The Court later granted cert. in the Kennedy case,
and ruled in favor of the coach's prayer. See supra notes 574-82.
539. Id. at 2267.
540. Id. at 2075 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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Montana Constitution's no-aid section, like other Blaine amendments,
was based on anti-Catholic bias and accordingly could not be upheld
as constitutional.5 4 1
Many commentators immediately noted that the ideal of separation of church and state was gone. 54 2 The sixth Catholic on the Court,
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, was the lone Catholic dissenter, as she was
in the Court's previous pro-religious aid case, Trinity Lutheran Church
of Columbia v. Comer.54 3 In Espinoza, Justice Sotomayor reiterated her
Trinity Lutheran point, that the decision "weakens this country's

longstanding commitment to a separation of church and state beneficial
to both." 544 "We once recognized that '[w]hile the Free Exercise Clause
clearly prohibits the use of state action to deny the rights of free exercise to anyone, it has never meant that a majority could use the machinery of the State to practice its beliefs."' 5 45 As before, Justice Sotomayor
was with Justice Brennan in spirit.

Religious school funding was also required in the third case, Carson v. Makin.54 6 Maine has many school districts that do not have a

public secondary school, but is required to provide public education to
all students. 54 7 In order to provide that education, Maine's law allows
funding for private school education, as long as the education is nonsectarian. 54 8 The parents' lawsuit takes aim at the program's "requirement that any school receiving tuition assistance payments must be 'a

with the First Amendment of the
nonsectarian school in accordance
549
United States Constitution."'
The parents won 6-3 in the Supreme Court, with Chief Justice
50
Roberts, joined by Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett.
Sotomayor again was the lone Catholic dissenter, joining Justice

541. Id. at 2274.
542. See, e.g., Mark Joseph Stern, John Roberts Just Bulldozed the Wall Separating
Church and State, Slate, Jun. 30. 2020, at https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/06/supremecourt-espinoza-montana-religious-schools.html.
543. Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2292 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Trinity Lutheran Church of
Columbia, 137 S. Ct. at 2027 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
544. Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2292 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
545. Id. at 2297.
546. Carson as next friend of O.C. v. Makin, 979 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 2020), cert. granted
sub nom. Carson v. Makin, 141 S. Ct. 2883 (2021); Carson as next friend of O. C. v. Makin, 142
S. Ct. 1987 (2022).
547. Carson, 142 S. Ct. at 1993.
548. Id. at 1993-94.
549. Id. at 1994 (quoting ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 2951(2) (West 2022)).
550. Id. at 1992.
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Breyer's dissent in part and writing for herself.55 ' Roberts wrote that
the Free Exercise Clause was violated because the state had discriminated against the religious schools because they were religious.ss2
In Carson, Roberts adopted the use argument that Gorsuch had
made in the earlier cases. He concluded that religious discrimination is
present when the government makes decisions based on religious status
or use.1 3 "The Court of Appeals also attempted to distinguish this case
from Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza on the ground that the funding restrictions in those cases were 'solely status-based religious discrimination,' while the challenged provision here 'imposes a use-based restriction.' Justice BREYER makes the same argument [in dissent]." 5

4

Roberts disagreed with them. He wrote that the religious aspects of education made a distinction between status and use irrelevant to the constitutional discussion; "any status-use distinction lacks a meaningful
application not only in theory, but in practice as well. In short, the prohibition on status-based discrimination under the Free Exercise Clause
is not a permission to engage in use-based discrimination."" This
time, there were no concurrences by Gorsuch or Thomas. They won the
use-based argument.
The opinion suggests that the religious schools can receive the aid,
even though they discriminate on the basis of "gender, gender-identity,

sexual orientation, and religion, and ...
Born Again Christians."

56

require [that] their teachers be

Justice Breyer was troubled by this. 55 7

Breyer's dissent also stated that Locke, the case that refused state funding for the study of ministry, required a ruling in Maine's favor. 558

However, Roberts stated there was no historical refusal to fund religious schooling while there had been a long tradition of not funding the
training of clergy allowed in Locke. ss9
Sotomayor did not join the section of Breyer's opinion defending
Trinity Lutheran.560 She is now the only Trinity dissenter left on the

551.
552.
553.
554.
555.
556.
557.
558.
559.
560.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 2003, 2012 (Breyer, J., dissenting; Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
at 1997-98, 2001-02.
at 2000-02.
at 2000.
at 2001
at 2010-11. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
at 2011.
at 2011-12.
at 2001-02.
at 2002, 2004-05.
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Court. 561 She repeated the argument that she made in the earlier two
cases, arguing that Carson had gone to the conclusion she feared in

Trinity. 562 The "Court continues to dismantle the wall of separation
between church and state that the Framers fought to build," 563 she
wrote.
What a difference five years makes. In 2017, I feared that the Court
was "lead[ing] us ... to a place where separation of church and state
is a constitutional slogan, not a constitutional commitment." Trinity
Lutheran (dissenting opinion). Today, the Court leads us to a place

where separation of church and state becomes a constitutional violation. If a State cannot offer subsidies to its citizens without being
required to fund religious exercise, any State that values its historic
antiestablishment interests more than this Court does will have to
curtail the support it offers to its citizens. With growing concern for

where this Court will lead us next, I respectfully dissent. 564

Is separation of church and state now a constitutional violation?
How much is left of the Establishment Clause? These three cases sug-

gest that the Catholics have won their goal of requiring the state to fund
religion whenever it funds other private entities.
In a funding case that the Court did not hear, Justice Kavanaugh,

joined by Justices Alito and Gorsuch, wrote a statement about the denial of certiorari in Morris County Board of Chosen Freeholders v.
Freedom from Religion Foundation.565 Morris County had historic

preservation funds that went to all kinds of buildings, including religious ones. 566 New Jersey law, however, did not allow funding for religious buildings.56 7 Justice Kavanaugh cited Justice Brennan's cases,
McDaniel and Larson, to state that the "principle of religious equality

eloquently articulated by Justice Brennan ... is []firmly rooted in this
Court's jurisprudence."5 68 Justice Kavanaugh cited Justice Kennedy's

561. See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2027
(2017).
562. Carson, 142 S. Ct. at 2012-15.
563. Id. at 2012.
564. Id. at 2014-15.
565. Morris Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Freedom from Religion Found., 139 S.
Ct. 909 (2019).
566. Id. at 909.
567. Id.
568. Id. at 909.
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opinion in Lukumi and the Smith case. 569 He also cited the numerous
cases about equal treatment for religious organizations, including Trinity Lutheran, Good News Club, Rosenberger, and Lamb's Chapel.570
"Barring religious organizations because they are religious from a general historic preservation grants program is pure discrimination against
religion."5 7 1 The justices concluded denial of certiorari was appropriate

because of the facts of the case and the new legacy of Trinity Lutheran.
We now know from Carson v. Makin what the legacy of Trinity Lu-

theran entails.
B.

More Government Prayer

The Establishment Clause was discarded in a case about a publicschool football coach's prayer with students, Kennedy v. Bremerton
School District. Remember the Lemon test, discussed at length ear-

lier?5 72 The Court finally dismissed it in its new case about prayer. 573
Kennedy allows a public school's football coach to lead his players in
public Christian prayer. Justice Gorsuch was joined by the other Catholic Justices on the Court, except for Justice Sotomayor, who once
again was the lone Catholic in dissent. 574 According to Gorsuch, "[i]n

place of Lemon and the endorsement test, this Court has instructed that
the Establishment Clause must be interpreted by "'reference to historical practices and understandings.'"" 575 Moreover, Gorsuch wrote there
was no evidence of coercion of the students to pray in the facts of the
case. 576

Lemon, endorsement, and coercion. For a long time, those were
the Justices' tests about Establishment. Open for debate now is what
will be protected-or not-by "historical practices and understandings." 577 The Court dismissed the two tests that gave Bremerton a win.
It also made it hard to fmd coercion, as past cases were worried about
the power of teachers to coerce their students into prayer. Gorsuch em-

phasized the free exercise and free speech rights of Kennedy, and was
569.
570.
571.
572.
573.
2022).
574.
575.
576.
577.

Id. at 909-10
Id. at 910.
Id. at 911.
See supra notes 170-74, 189-92 and accompanying text.
Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., No. 21-418, 2022 WL 2295034 (U.S. June 27,
Id. at *3.
Id. at *14.
Id.
Id. at *3.
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barely concerned about establishment. In his words: "Nor does a proper
understanding of the Amendment's Establishment Clause require the
government to single out private religious speech for special disfavor."
578
579
Sotomayor complained again in her pro-establishment dissent.
She argues that "Members of the current majority [] effect fundamental
changes in this Court's Religion Clauses jurisprudence, all the while
proclaiming that nothing has changed at all." 5 80 Commentators worry
that more coercion of religion is allowed under the Court's new test. 58 1
Future cases will tell us what the new interpretations of the Religion

Clauses hold.
C.

The End of Korematsu and the Beginning of Something Else?

Remember that Justice Murphy dissented in the Japanese internment case, Korematsu.5 8 2 Korematsu returned to the Court with President Trump's Muslim ban. 583 Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices
Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch, upheld President Trump's ban
on Muslim immigration to the United States. 584 Justice Kennedy and

Justice Thomas wrote concurrences while Justice Sotomayor dissented. 585 The case was remarkable for two reasons. First, the Court
finally questioned the truth of Korematsu, the Japanese internment
case. 586 Second, it upheld a program against Muslim immigration that

the dissenters thought was similar to Korematsu.587 The majority
thought the president had met his constitutional obligations, while the
dissenters believed he had discriminated against Muslims. 588
Chief Justice Roberts concluded the President's program was neu-

tral toward religion and based on legitimate national security
578. Id.
579. See Leslie C. Griffin, Goodbye to the EstablishmentClause, JUSTIA: VERDICT (June
28, 2022), https://verdict.justia.com/2022/06/28/goodbye-to-the-establishment-clause.
580. Kennedy, 2022 WL 2295034, at *27 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
581. See, e.g., Mark Joseph Stern, Supreme Court Lets Public Schools Coerce Students
into Practicing Christianity, SLATE (June 27, 2022), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2022/06/coach-kennedy-bremerton-prayer-football-public-school.html.
582. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 233 (1944).
583. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
584. Id.
585. Id. at 2423-34 (Kennedy, J., concurring, Thomas, J., concurring, and Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
586. Id. at 2423.
587. Id.
588. Id. at 2420-22.
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concerns.5 89 Justice Kennedy's concurrence encouraged government

officials to demonstrate their commitment to the Constitution, even in
foreign affairs. 590 Justice Thomas noticed "the President has inherent
authority to exclude aliens from the country." 59 1
Dissenting Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority had failed
to protect religious neutrality by allowing an openly anti-Muslim policy that was "first advertised openly and unequivocally as a 'total and
complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States' because the
policy now masquerades behind a facade of national-security concerns." 5 92 Justice Sotomayor believed the full facts demonstrated that
President Trump had acted out of "hostility and animus toward the
Muslim faith," consistent with how the Japanese were treated in Korematsu.593 Maybe Justice Sotomayor was picking up Murphy's theme of
understanding and opposing discrimination.
Chief Justice Roberts' opinion replied specifically to Justice So-

tomayor's dissent about Korematsu:
Finally, the dissent invokes Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 65 S.Ct. 193, 89 L.Ed. 194 (1944). Whatever rhetorical advantage the dissent may see in doing so, Korematsu has nothing to

do with this case. The forcible relocation of U.S. citizens to concentration camps, solely and explicitly on the basis of race, is objectively unlawful and outside the scope of Presidential authority. But
it is wholly inapt to liken that morally repugnant order to a facially
neutral policy denying certain foreign nationals the privilege of admission. The entry suspension is an act that is well within executive
authority and could have been taken by any other President-the
only question is evaluating the actions of this particular President in
promulgating an otherwise valid Proclamation.
The dissent's reference to Korematsu, however, affords this Court
the opportunity to make express what is already obvious: Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled
in the court of history, and-to be clear-"has no place in law under
the Constitution."59
589. Id. at 2423.
590. Id. at 2423-29 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
591. Id. at 2424 (Thomas, J., concurring).
592. Id. at 2433 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
593. Id. at 2435.
594. Id. at 2423 (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944) (Jackson,
J., dissenting)).
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So, the Court agrees with Justice Murphy's early dissent that Ko-

rematsu was "gravely wrong the day it was decided" and now has been
overruled. 595 But Trump v. Hawaiiraises new questions about the president's freedom to discriminate against a religious group, in this case
Muslims.
D. Another Public Monument is A "SecularCross"
In another public monument case, the Court upheld a cross on

public land in an opinion by Justice Alito, joined in different parts by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh. 596 Justices Thomas and

Gorsuch concurred in the judgment only. 597 Justices Thomas, Gorsuch,
and Kavanaugh all filed concurrences. Justice Sotomayor joined Justice Ginsburg's dissent.598

The Humanists had challenged a Maryland cross that sat on public
land. 599 Justice Alito's decision concluded that over time the cross, a
symbol of Christianity, has taken on a "secular meaning.60 0 Indeed,
there are instances in which its message is now almost entirely secular." 601 Justice Thomas repeated his point against the incorporation of

the Establishment Clause and argued that the cross did not coerce. 602
He called for Lemon to be overruled and did not join the Court's opinion because it did not "adequately clarify the appropriate standard for

Establishment Clause cases." 603 Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice
Thomas, thought the case should be dismissed for lack of standing and

should be rejected for that reason. 604 Justice Kavanaugh explained that
the Lemon test was not good law in five categories: "(1) religious symbols on government property and religious speech at government
events; (2) religious accommodations and exemptions from generally

applicable laws; (3) government benefits and tax exemptions for religious organizations; (4) religious expression in public schools; and (5)

595.
596.
597.
598.
599.
600.
601.
602.
603.
604.

Id.
Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass'n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019).
Id. at 2094-2103 (Thomas, J., concurring and Gorsuch, J., concurring).
Id. at 2103-13 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2074.
Id at 2090.
Id. at 2074.
Id. at 2094-95 (Thomas, I., concurring).
Id. at 2097.
Id. at 2098-2103 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).

234

WILLAMETTE LAW REVIEW

[58:163

regulation of private religious speech in public forums." 605 He also suggested that, whatever the Court said about it, the state legislature or
governor could require the cross to be removed. 606
Justice Ginsburg's dissent argued the Court "elevates Christianity
over other faiths, and religion over nonreligion," a result the First
Amendment is supposed to prevent. 607 Religious freedom has reached

the point, however, where the Christian cross is ruled to be secular.
E.

Prisoners'Religion

In Murphy v. Collier, the Court granted a stay of execution for
Patrick Henry Murphy, a Texas prisoner who argued that his Buddhist
spiritual advisor was not allowed to be present during his execution,
even though Christian and Muslim advisors were. 608 Justices Thomas
and Gorsuch would not have allowed the stay. 60 9 Justice Kavanaugh
argued that the choice was now up to Texas. 610 "What the State may
not do, in my view, is allow Christian or Muslim inmates but not Bud-

dhist inmates to have a religious adviser of their religion in the execution room."6 11 Justice Alito dissented, joined by Justices Thomas and
Gorsuch, arguing that Murphy's claim should have been brought much
earlier, and not at the time that the execution was about to take place. 61 2
Because Murphy's claim was "egregiously delayed," his request for a
stay should not have been granted. 613
The Court had denied a similar request from a Muslim prisoner
who did not have a Muslim advocate, over dissent by four, including
Justice Sotomayor.614 In both cases, several justices were angered by
the long delay of the prisoners in raising their claims. 6 15
The Supreme Court then granted a stay of execution to an Ala-

bama prisoner until his Christian pastor was allowed to attend the

605. Id. at 2092 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
606. Id at 2092-94.
607. Id. at 2104 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
608. Murphy v. Collier, 139 S. Ct. 1475 (Mem.) (2019).
609. Id. at 1475.
610. Id. at 1476 (Kacanaugh, J., concurring).
611. Id.
612. Id. at 1485 (Alito, J., dissenting).
613. Id.
614. Dunn v. Ray, 139 S. Ct. 661 (2019).
615. Murphy, 139 S. Ct. at 1477-78 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring and Alito, J., dissenting);
Dunn, 139 S.Ct. at 662 (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("I also see no reason to reject the Eleventh Circuit's finding that Ray brought his claim in a timely manner.").
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execution. 616 Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and
Barrett, ruled that the state had not given a convincing reason as to why

the pastor was absent. 617 Security did not satisfy strict scrutiny because
it was possible to find clergy who would agree to act safely. 6 18 Chief
Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Kavanaugh would have
allowed the execution to continue. 6 19 Either Justice Alito, Justice Gorsuch, or both, must have joined the four to create a majority to stop the

execution, but the opinion did not make clear how they had voted.620
Post-Murphy, Alabama had barred all spiritual advisors from the execution. 621 Post-Supreme Court decision, Alabama said Smith would not

be given the death penalty. 622
John Ramirez was a Texas prisoner sentenced to death. 623 He orig-

inally complained when the state refused to allow his pastor to be pre62 5
sent during his execution. 624 Texas reversed the no-pastor policy.

Ramirez then asked that his pastor be allowed to touch his body and to
pray audibly at the execution. Texas denied both requests. 626
Eight Justices ruled for Ramirez, concluding that he had stated a

probably successful RLUIPA claim that must be resolved before the
state began his execution. 627 His religion was substantially burdened by
the state's refusal. 62 8 The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts,

concluded that the state's denial was not the "least restrictive means"
of achieving its goals. 629 Roberts was joined by Breyer, Alito, So-

tomayor,
616.
617.
618.
619.
620.

Kagan,

Gorsuch,

Kavanaugh and

Barrett. 630

Justice

Dunn v. Smith, 141 S. Ct. 725 (2021).
Id. at 725 (Kagan, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 726.
Justices Alito and Gorsuch did not sign onto any opinion in the case. See Id. at 725-

27.
621. Amy Howe, Court Won't Allow Alabama Execution Without a Pastor,
SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 12, 2021, 2:35 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/02/court-wont-allow-alabama-execution-without-a-pastor.
622. See Alabama Calls Off Execution After U.S. Supreme Court Says it Has to Let Inmate

Have PastorPresent, CBS NEWS (Feb. 12, 2021, 8:11 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/alabama-execution-willie-smith-pastor-supreme-court.
623. Ramirez v. Collier, 142 S. Ct. 1264, 1272 (2022).
624. Id. at 1273.
625. Id.
626. Id. at 1274.
627. Id. at 1284.
628. Id. at 1278.
629. Id. at 1279
630. Id. at 1271.
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Sotomayor and Justice Kavanaugh each wrote a concurrence, focusing

on how the states could handle such prisoner requests in the future. 631
Justice Thomas was the sole dissenter, complaining, in particular,

that Ramirez had long delayed his execution and was using this lawsuit
to delay even more. 632
F.

COVID and Justice Barrett Arrive at the Court
In 2020, COVID hit the courts as many governments limited the

size of religious gatherings, or their ability to meet in person, in order
to limit COVID's transmission rate.
In South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, Chief Justice
Roberts joined Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan in al-

lowing California's restrictions to stay in place. 633 Justices Thomas,
Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh dissented. 634 Chief Justice Roberts em-

phasized the need for the Court to defer to the government's difficult
decisions about the public's health. 635 As Chief Justice Roberts explained it:
Although California's guidelines place restrictions on places of
worship, those restrictions appear consistent with the Free Exercise

Clause of the First Amendment. Similar or more severe restrictions
apply to comparable secular gatherings, including lectures, concerts, movie showings, spectator sports, and theatrical performances, where large groups of people gather in close proximity for
extended periods of time. And the Order exempts or treats more leniently only dissimilar activities, such as operating grocery stores,
banks, and laundromats, in which people neither congregate in large

groups nor remain in close proximity for extended periods. 636

In contrast, the dissenters would have granted the application believing that the regulations discriminated against places of worship and
in favor of secular workplaces. 637

631.
632.
633.
634.
635.
636.
637.

Id. at 1271, 1284-89 (Sotomayor, J., concurring; Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
Id. at 1290-91 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020).
Id. at 1614.
Id. at 1613.
Id. at 1613 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 1614 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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A similar request for relief was denied in Calvary ChapelDayton

Valley v. Sisolak.63 8 Justices Alito, Thomas, and Kavanaugh dissented,
criticizing the Nevada governor's decision to exempt casinos but not
churches from its limitations. 63 9 Justice Alito emphasized that public
health emergencies did not allow the government to ignore the Constitution.6 40 Justice Gorsuch added a comparison between the churches
and synagogues vs. theaters and casinos; in "Nevada, it seems, it is better to be in entertainment than religion.... But there is no world in
which the Constitution permits Nevada to favor Caesars Palace over
Calvary Chapel."64 1 Justice Kavanaugh explained at length why the
state's policy discriminated against religion in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. 642

Then the votes changed with the addition of Justice Barrett to the
Court. By a 5-4 vote, the Court ruled that New York had violated the
First Amendment by placing the churches and synagogues into red

zones that limited the number of participants. 64 3 A per curiam decision
granted the religious organizations' requests. 644 Justices Gorsuch and

Kavanaugh concurred, and Chief Justice Roberts dissented.64 5 Then, in
a 6-3 decision in February 2021, the Court ruled that California must
open the churches that had been closed for indoor worship due to
COVID-19. 646 The Court allowed the State's bans on singing and
chanting to continue, although those bans could be challenged if the
churches presented more facts in future litigation.6 47 The State can still
hold the churches to 25% capacity .648

Justices Gorsuch and Thomas would have given the churches freedom in all these areas. 649 Justice Alito joined those two, but would have
given the State thirty days before the injunction against it could take

638. Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603 (Mem.) (2020) (denying
application for injunctive relief).
639. Id. at 2603-04 (Alito, J., dissenting).
640. Id. at 2604.
641. Id. at 2609 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
642. Id. at 2609-15 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
643. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) (per curiam).
644. Id. at 68.
645. Id. at 69-76 (Gorsuch, J., concurring, Kavanaugh, J., concurring, and Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
646. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 716 (Mem.) (2021).
647. Id. at 716.
648. Id.
649. Id. at 716.
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effect. 650 In her first opinion, Justice Barrett, joined by Justice Ka-

vanaugh, argued that the churches had not yet shown that the singing
and chanting bans were too strong, but that they could litigate that in
the future. 651 Chief Justice Roberts deferred to the State's wishes on
singing, chanting, and size of attendance, but ruled that there should
not be deference to the closing of the churches. 652 Justice Kagan dissented, joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor, and concluded that
science had been abandoned in favor of judicial edict. 653
In another 2021 case, in a per curiam opinion, Justices Thomas,
Alito, Kavanaugh, Gorsuch, and Barrett voted for religion. 654 Chief
Justice Roberts voted to deny the application. 655 Justice Kagan, joined

by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor, dissented. 656 The majority first cited
Roman Catholicfor the rule that, "whenever they treat any comparable
secular activity more favorably than religious exercise," the government's action is subject to strict scrutiny.657 Its second point was that
comparability depends on the risks faced by participants and not on the
reasons they gather. 658 Third, strict scrutiny means that when the government allows other activities to proceed, "it must show that the religious exercise at issue is more dangerous than those activities even

when the same precautions are applied." 659 And fourth, cases are not
mooted when the government changes the regulations. 660

In applying strict scrutiny, the Court noted that California treated
"hair salons, retail stores, personal care services, movie theaters, pri-

vate suites at sporting events and concerts, and indoor restaurants"
more favorably than religions. 661 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit had not
required the state "to explain why it could not safely permit at-home

650. Id.
651. Id. at 717.
652. Id. at 716-17 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
653. See Id. at 723 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that "the Court forges ahead ... insisting
that science-based policy yield to judicial edict.").
654. Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294 (2021) (per curiam).
655. Id. at 1298.
656. Id. (Kagan, J., with Breyer, J., and Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
657. Id. at 1296 (citing Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63,
67-68 (2020) (emphasis in original).
658. Id. at 1296-98.
659. Id. at 1297.
660. Id.
661. Id.
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worshipers to gather in larger numbers while using precautions used in
secular activities."662
In contrast, Justice Kagan's dissent argued that the state must treat

comparable secular and religious conduct alike. She argued that if the
state treats secular gatherings in homes like religious gatherings in

homes, it has complied with the First Amendment. 663 Secular at-home
meetings were the "obvious comparator" in this case, not hardware
stores and hair salons: "[T]he law does not require that the State equally
treat apples and watermelons." 664 Justice Kagan wrote that the per curiam opinion was wrong in concluding the Ninth Circuit had not con-

cluded that the secular activities posed a lesser risk because the court
had in fact done that.665 Repeating her text from South Bay, Justice Kagan argued the majority was "treating unlike cases, not like ones, equiv-

alently," as well as ignoring the state's scientific and health care findings.66 6 It "disregard[ed] law and facts alike." 667
Tandon, a pre-Fulton decision, led some commentators to conclude that the Court had overruled Smith in its shadow docket:
In Tandon, however, the majority effectively overturned Smith by
establishing a new rule, often called the "most favored nation" theory. Under this doctrine, any secular exemption to a law automatically creates a claim for a religious exemption, vastly expanding the
government's obligation to provide religious accommodations to

countless regulations. In Tandon, for instance, the Supreme Court
held that California had to let people gather indoors for Bible study
because it allowed them to gather indoors to get a haircut, eat, or
take a bus; if Californians can get pedicures, they must also be permitted to spend hours in close quarters discussing the Bible. And
the Supreme Court created this sweeping new rule through its
shadow docket-those cases decided with minimal briefing and no
66 8
oral argument outside the court's normal procedure.

662. Id.
663. Id. at 1298 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
664. Id. at 1298.
665. Id.
666. Id. at 1299 (quoting South Bay United Pentacostal Church v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct.
716, 722 (mem.) (2021) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
667. Tandon, 141 S. Ct. at 1299.
668. Mark Joseph Stern, The Supreme Court Broke Its Own Rules to Radically Redefine
Religious Liberty, SLATE (Apr. 12, 2021, 2:51 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021 /04/supreme-court-religious-liberty-covid-california.html.
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Fulton, however, shows that Smith has survived, for now.
The Court also refused to grant an injunction pausing Maine's regulation requiring healthcare workers to be vaccinated against COVID19.669 No religious exemptions were allowed by the state. 67 0 If the
workers are not vaccinated, they lose their jobs. 67 1 Justices Gorsuch,

Thomas, and Alito dissented. 672 They would have granted the exemption, arguing that the law did not satisfy strict scrutiny under the Court's

jurisprudence under Lukumi, Fulton, and Tandon.673 The Justices re-

peatedly debate just how and why religion should be protected.
VI. HOW

CATHOLICS VOTED ON THE LIFE ISSUES

Catholic Justices have also voted about life-related issues, including abortion, contraception, medical treatment, and marriage. Recently,
Justices Alito, Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett overruled the

abortion cases, Roe and Casey.674
Justice Brennan voted for the constitutional right to contracep-

tion 675

and for the right to abortion. 676 He dissented in the abortion

funding cases, voting in favor of funding in Maher v. Roe 677 and Harris

v. McRae.678 In those early cases, he was the only Catholic on the Court.
679 Justice Brennan was pro-abortion and contraception rights through-

out his career on the Court. 680

669. Does 1-3 v. Mills, 142 S. Ct. 17 (2021).
670. Id.
671. Id.
672. Id. at 18 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
673. Id. at 22 ("There, healthcare workers who have served on the front line of a pandemic
for the last 18 months are now being fired and their practices shuttered. All for adhering to their
constitutionally protected religious beliefs. Their plight is worthy of our attention. I would grant
relief.").
674. Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., No. 19-1392, 2022 WL 2276808 (U.S. June
24, 2022).
675. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
676. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
677. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting.
678. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
679. See Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 60.
680. See, e.g., Griswold, 410 U.S. 113; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1982); Roe, 410
U.S. 113; Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975);
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo.. 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Belloti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1978)
(Stevens, J., concurring); Harris, 448 U.S. 297 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Maher, 432 U.S. 262
(Brennan, J., dissenting); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416
(1983); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492
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Justices Scalia and Thomas always voted anti-abortion. 681 Justice
Kennedy was on both sides, upholding some abortion legislation and
striking down other bills.68 2 He was part of the plurality that kept Roe
from being overturned in Casey, while Justice Scalia and Justice

Thomas dissented. 683
Justice Sotomayor has always voted pro-choice. 68 4 Justices Ken-

nedy and Sotomayor voted together to invalidate some Texas laws restricting abortion in Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt.685 Chief

Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito dissented, voting to
uphold the regulations. 686

Nonetheless, Chief Justice Roberts joined Justice Sotomayor in
the majority of June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo, a case that on
687
the facts was very similar to Whole Woman's Health. Many com-

mentators think Chief Justice Roberts's opinion limited the right to

688
abortion over previous opinions, including Whole Woman's Health.
Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh dissented, showing
689
the two new Catholics on the Court were anti-choice.
Trump's third nominee, Justice Amy Coney Barrett, provided the
fifth vote to overrule Roe and Casey, ruling definitively that the

U.S. 490 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Hodgson v. Minnesota,
497 U.S. 417 (1990).
681. See Robert Cassidy, Scalia on Abortion: Originalism ... But, Why?, 32 TOURO L.
REV. 741, 742-45 (2016); Robert Barnes, For Clarence Thomas, A vowed Critic of Roc v. Wade,
Mississippi Abortion Case a Moment Long Awaited, WASH. POST (Nov. 27, 2021, 6:57 p.m.),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/clarence-thomas-aborRobert Barnes and
tion/2021/11/27/31f3c960-4c76-1lec-bObO-766bbbe79347_story.html;
Shelly Tan, What the Supreme Court Justices Have Said About Abortion and Roe v. Wade,

WASH. POST (May 3, 2022, 9:33 a.m.), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/interactive/2021/supreme-court-abortion-stances/. But see Timothy Zick, Justice Scalia and Abortion
Speech, 15 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 288 (2017).
682. See Sherry Colb, Justice Kennedy, Abortion and the Legacy of a Third Choice,
SCOTUSBLOG (July 6, 2018, 9:50 a.m.), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/07/justice-kennedy-abortion-and-the-legacy-of-a-third-choice/; JON O. SH IMABUKURO, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
LSB 10185, ABORTION, JUSTICE KENNEDY, AND JUDGE KAVANAUGH 2-3 (2018).

683. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979
(1992) (Scalia, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
684. See Robert Barnes and Shelly Tan, What the Supreme Court Justices Have Said
About Abortion and Roe v. Wade, WASH. POST (May 3, 2022, 9:33 a.m.), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/interactive/202 1/supreme-court-abortion-stances/.
685. Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
686. Id. at 2330 (Alito, J., dissenting).
687. June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2133 (2020) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring).
688. Id.
689. Id. at 2142.
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Constitution does not protect a right to abortion. Barrett voted as Ginsburg had not. With Barrett as the ninth Justice, the Court first allowed
a ban on abortion after six weeks to take effect in Texas. 6 90 Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan dissented. 691

Unnamed in the opinion were the five who agreed to the abortion ban,
namely Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. The

Court's action has allowed abortions to virtually end in Texas. 692
Then the Court took the biggest step of all. It overruled Roe and
Casey in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, which in-

volved a Mississippi law that bans abortion after fifteen weeks. 693 Chief
Justice Roberts's concurrence argued that the Court should exercise
more judicial restraint, upholding Mississippi's law without overruling
the precedents. 694
But five Justices concluded abortion enjoys no protection in the
Constitution, so states may regulate it as they wish. 695 States are now

allowed to limit abortion from the moment of conception, which is
completely consistent with the Vatican's teachings against abortion. 696

About half the states are expected to limit or ban abortion. 697 Justice
Sotomayor defended the Court's abortion precedents. 698
In other life cases, Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, Justice

Kennedy, and Justice Thomas joined Justice Alito's opinion in Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby, ruling that RFRA gives employers a right to refuse
contraceptive insurance coverage to their employees. 699 Justice So-

tomayor joined the dissenters, and she repeated the same opposition to
690. Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson, 141 S. Ct. 2494 (2021).
691. Id.
692. See, e.g., Karen Brooks Harper & Eleanor Klibanoff, Fewer Patients, Smaller Staff
an Uncertain Future: Abortion Providers Await Court Decision on Texas Law, THE TEXAS

TRIBUNE, Nov. 23, 2021, https://www.texastribune.org/2021/11/23/texas-abortion-providerssupreme-court/.
693. Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., No. 19-1392, 2022 WL 2276808, at *8
(U.S. June 24, 2022)
694. Id. at *67-71.
695. Id. at *43.
696. See Philip Pullella, Vatican PraisesU.S. CourtDecision, Saying it Challenges World,
REUTERS (June 24, 2002), https://www.rcuters.com/world/us/vatican-praises-us-court-decisionabortion-saying-it-challenges-world-2022-06-24/.
697. See Elizabeth Nash & Lauren Cross, 26 States are Certainor Likely to Ban Abortion
Without Roe: Here's Which Ones and Why, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE (Apr. 19, 2022),
https://www.guttmacher.org/article/2021 /10/26-states-are-certain-or-likely-ban-abortion-without-roe-heres-which-ones-and-why.
698. Dobbs, 2022 WL 2276808, at *73-94.
699. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
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the contraceptive exception in Wheaton College v. Burwell.700 In a re-

cent case, where President Trump had expanded the number of employers who could be exempt from the contraceptive mandate, all five Catholic male justices-Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, Justice

Alito, Justice Gorsuch, and Justice Kavanaugh-voted to allow the
mandate. 70 1 Justice Sotomayor was one of only two dissenters against
the policy. 702
A unanimous Court-eight Justices, without Justice Barrett yet on
the Court-ruled in an opinion by Justice Thomas that RFRA allows

individuals to claim money damages against government officials in
their individual capacities. 703 Tanvir and others were Muslims who argued the government had put them on the No Fly List because they
refused to inform about their religious communities. 704 The government's action cost them damages from items including wasted plane

tickets and lost salary. 705 The Court studied RFRA's language carefully
and concluded that the statute's language allows damages against gov-

ernment officials in their individual capacities as part of the statute's
"appropriate relief." 706 RFRA, which was passed in opposition to
Smith, 707 always wins at the Court.

While Justices Scalia and Kennedy voted against a right to refuse
medical treatment in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health,708 Justice Brennan dissented in favor of it, arguing Nancy Cru-

zan was "entitled to choose to die with dignity."709 Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas later joined a unanimous Court, refusing to recognize a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide. 710 Almost ten
years later, Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion concluding that

700. Id. at 739 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Wheaton College v. Burwell, 573 U.S. 958, 96071 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
701. Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct.
2367 (2020).
702. Id.
703. Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486 (2020).
704. Id. at 489.
705. Id.
706. Id. at 489.
707. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 § 2(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a); Whitney
K. Novak, CONG. RSCH. SERV. IF111490, THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT: A
PRIMER 1 (2020).
708. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
709. Id. at 302 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
710. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); See also Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S.
793 (1997).
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Oregon had a state right to allow physician-assisted suicide,7 1 ' while
Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented in that case, favoring the federal
government's powers to limit what the states could do. 712
Justice Kennedy wrote four pro-gay rights decisions. In Romer v.

Evans, he wrote the majority opinion concluding that an anti-gay-rights
amendment to Colorado's Constitution was unconstitutional. 713 Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented:
The Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite. The constitutional amendment before us here is not the manifestation of a
"'bare ... desire to harm"' homosexuals, but is rather a modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to
revise those mores through use of the laws. That objective, and the
means chosen to achieve it, are not only unimpeachable under any
constitutional doctrine hitherto pronounced (hence the opinion's
heavy reliance upon principles of righteousness rather than judicial
holdings); they have been specifically approved by the Congress of
the United States and by this Court.7
Justice Kennedy wrote Lawrence v. Texas, which recognized that

a Texas law banning same-sex relations was unconstitutional.7 1 5 Justices Scalia and Thomas also dissented in that case. 71 6
Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion concluding the Defense of
Marriage Act, which had lowered tax and other benefits to LGBTQs,
was unconstitutional. 717 He was joined in the majority by Justice So-

tomayor. 718 The dissenters were Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia,

Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito. 7 19 In a subsequent case, Justice Ken-

nedy wrote the opinion, and Justice Sotomayor joined him, upholding
the constitutionality of same-sex marriage. 72 0 Chief Justice Roberts,

711. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
712. Id at 275 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
713. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
714. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
715. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
716. Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
717. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 749-52 (2013).
718. Id. at 747.
719. Id. at 775 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also Id. at 778 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see
also Id. at 802 (Alito, J., dissenting).
720. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, (2015).
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Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito dissented.721 The
Court then reviewed an Arkansas case in which state law did not allow
both members of a same-sex marriage to be listed as parents of their
children. 2 2 The State listed only the birth mother's name. 72 3 Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy and Sotomayor joined a per curiam

decision ruling that the state law violated Obergefell.724 Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, dissented, arguing that
Obergefell did not cover this situation. 72 5
Justice Kennedy, however, wrote a 7-2 decision upholding the
right of a baker to deny a wedding cake to a gay couple even though

state law prohibited discrimination against LGBTQs. 726 Chief Justice
Roberts, Justice Thomas, Justice Alito, and Justice Gorsuch agreed
with him that the Civil Rights Commission had spoken negatively
about religion when discussing the case and therefore violated the Free
Exercise Clause. 727
Freedom of religion and religion has been used to justify all kinds
of discrimination throughout history, whether it be slavery, whether
it be the holocaust, whether it be-I mean, we-we can list hun-

dreds of situations where freedom of religion has been used to justify discrimination. And to me it is one of the most despicable pieces
of rhetoric that people can use to-to use their religion to hurt others.

728

All very truthful, but Justice Kennedy found a free exercise violation
there. Justice Gorsuch concurred, joined by Justice Alito, arguing that

the Commission had not treated Phillips neutrally. 729 Justice Thomas
concurred in part, joined by Justice Gorsuch, concluding that Colorado
had failed to honor Phillips' free speech.7 30 Only Justice Sotomayor

721.
722.
723.
724.
725.
726.
727.
728.
729.
730.

Id. at 686-742.
Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017) (per curiam).
Id. at 2077.
Id. at 2075
Id. at 2079 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civ. Rts. Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
Id.
Id. at 1729.
Id. at 1734-40 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
Id. at 1740-48 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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viewed what happened as appropriate government activity, rather than

discrimination. 73 1
Then the Court issued a pro-gay rights decision. By a 6-3 vote,
Justice Gorsuch, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan, ruled that Title VIII

prohibits

gay and transgender discrimination. 7 32 Justices Alito,

Thomas, and Kavanaugh dissented, accusing the majority of misreading the statute and legislating. 733

Although Bostock looked like a big victory for LGBTQ rights,
Justice Gorsuch's opinion noted the cases where religion might lead to
a different result. He mentioned the details of Title VII, RFRA, and the
ministerial exception as issues that raised questions about religious
freedom and gay rights. 734
Fulton then showed that LGBTQ persons lose to religious free-

dom. 735 Fulton was a case argued before the Court, not a shadow docket
case. At issue was the question that has arisen throughout this paper: is

free exercise best protected by Smith, Sherbert, or something else? For
now, Smith is still the law. Fulton says that, but also raises questions of
other non-Smith options for the future. 736

Recall the issue in Fulton. Philadelphia law says no discrimination
against LGBTQs is allowed, and for that reason ended its program with
Catholic Social Services, which refuses to give foster children to

LGBTQ parents. 737 On a straightforward reading of Smith, which the
Third Circuit followed, the antidiscrimination law is a neutral law of
general applicability, and therefore the Catholics were not allowed an
exemption from it and lost.738
Catholic Social Services challenged that conclusion. Its certiorari
petition asked "[w]hether Employment Division v. Smith should be re-

visited?"7 39 The petition advocated that the Court should "revisit Smith
and return to a standard that can better balance governmental interests

731. Id. at 1748-52 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
732. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1744-54 (2020).
733. See Id. at 1754 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also Id. at 1822 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
734. Id.
735. Fulton v. Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021).
736. Id. at 1876-77, 1881.
737. Id. at 1874.
738. Fulton v. Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019).
739. Petition for Certiorari at 1, Fulton v. Philadelphia 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021) (No. 19123), 2019 WL 3380520, at *i.
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and fundamental rights." 740 They sought a "more administrable rule
that adequately protects a fundamental first amendment right." 74 1
Would that mean that the Court would return to Sherbert, with its
compelling interest standard, as a rule for future free exercise cases and

reject the Smith rule followed by the Third Circuit? Not yet.
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion for the Court, joined by
742
FolJustices Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett.

lowing Smith, Chief Justice Roberts concluded the Philadelphia law
was not generally applicable because it allowed the City to make exceptions. 74 3 The cited law said:
"Rejection of Referral. Provider shall not reject a child or family

including, but not limited to, ... prospective foster or adoptive parents, for Services based upon ... their . . sexual orientation ...
unless an exception is grantedby the Commissioner or the Commis7
sioner'sdesignee, in his/hersole discretion." 44

Because the law was not generally applicable, strict scrutiny, not
Smith applied. 745 Then the majority concluded that the "City offers no
compelling reason why it has a particular interest in denying an excep-

tion to CSS while making them available to others." 746 The majority

concluded that granting an exception to CSS would not undermine the
City's goals of maximizing the number of foster families and minimiz-

ing liability. 74 7
Not one separate word of protest arose from Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, or Kagan. Justice Sotomayor in particular could have been

expected to vote with the gay individuals and not with the religion.
Their silence was likely due to their view that maintaining Smith was
important, and so they were quiet and silently joined the other three to
defeat LGBTQs but win for Smith.

740.
741.
742.
743.
744.
745.
746.
747.

Id. at 31.
Id. at 34.
Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 1868.
Id. at 1878.
Id. (alteration in original) (second emphasis added).
Id. at 1879.
Id. at 1882.
Id. at 1881-82.
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Justice Barrett, a former law clerk to Justice Scalia, 748 wrote a concurrence joined by Justice Kavanaugh and, in all except the first paragraph, by Justice Breyer.7 4 9 The first paragraph was critical of Smith.

Justice Barrett asked, "Yet what should replace Smith?"7 50 She concluded:
As the Court's opinion today explains, the government contract at
issue provides for individualized exemptions from its nondiscrimination rule, thus triggering strict scrutiny. And all nine Justices
agree that the City cannot satisfy strict scrutiny. I therefore see no
reason to decide in this case whether Smith should be overruled,
much less what should replace it. I join the Court's opinion in

full. 75 1

Justice Alito wrote a long concurrence with Justices Thomas and

Gorsuch. 752 Justice Alito said the Court should have addressed Smith,
which was the whole purpose of granting certiorari. 753 Justice Alito's

decision could be the opinion of the future Court, but it has not yet
received five votes. Justice Alito concluded:
If Smith is overruled, what legal standard should be applied in this
case? The answer that comes most readily to mind is the standard
that Smith replaced: A law that imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise can be sustained only if it is narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling government interest. 754

Strict scrutiny all the time, instead of occasionally. Justice Alito
defended the religious right to discriminate against LGBTQ individuals, as he had in dissent in Obergefell. Justice Alito concluded with
these sad words:
After receiving more than 2,500 pages of briefing and after more
than a half-year of post-argument cogitation, the Court has emitted

748. Current Members, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,

premecourt.gov/about/memberstext.aspx (last visited Jun. 16, 2022).
749. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1882 (Barrett, J., concurring).
750. Id.
751. Id. at 1883.
752. Id. at 1883 (Alito, J., concurring).
753. Id. at 1887.
754. Id. at 1924 (Alito, J., concurring).
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a wisp of a decision that leaves religious liberty in a confused and
vulnerable state. Those who count on this Court to stand up for the
First Amendment have every right to be disappointed-as am I.755
Justice Gorsuch's concurrence was very critical of Chief Justice

Roberts's reasoning in the majority, especially his reading of Philadelphia law. 756 He said no amici or parties asked for the outcome Chief
Justice Roberts gave them:
Given all the maneuvering, it's hard not to wonder if the majority is
so anxious to say nothing about Smith's fate that it is willing to say
pretty much anything about municipal law and the parties' briefs.

One way or another, the majority seems determined to declare there
is no "need" or "reason" to revisit Smith today. 757

Like Justice Alito, Justice Gorsuch predicted that these cases would
keep returning to the Court, costing the religions a lot of money, until

the Court had the courage to protect religion even more than it is already protected. "So what are we waiting for?" he asked.7 58 "Rather
than adhere to Smith ... , the Court should overrule it now, set us back
on the correct course, and address each case as it comes." 759
So, can we count to five? Could Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch,
join with, perhaps, Justices Barrett and Kavanaugh to change the rule
of law from Smith? Would Justice Breyer have joined them? What
about Justice Breyer's replacement, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson,

who is Protestant? 760 For now, we wait to see if the seven-Catholic
Court will give more protection to religious freedom, neglecting civil

rights in the name of the First Amendment.
VII. CONCLUSION

The Catholic justices have had an interesting history. We already
know that, as a matter of free exercise and non-establishment, the Court
has expanded the funding available to religious organizations. While
755. Id. at 1926.
756. Id. at 1929 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
757. Id. at 1929.
758. Id. at 1931.
759. Id.
760. Diana Chandler, Ketanji Brown Jackson to become lone avowed Protestant on High
https://www.baptistpress.com/resource-li2022,
Apr. 20,
Press,
Baptist
Court,
brary/news/ketanji-brown-jackson-to-become-lone-avowed-protestant-on-high-court/.
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allowing the institutions to receive more funding, it has also given them
ever-increasing freedom to violate all the antidiscrimination laws of the
state and federal governments for anyone they call a minister. The
Court also continues to approve government-sponsored religious mon-

uments as well as government prayer. Public school employees now
enjoy more rights to pray publicly with students.The Fulton concurrences told us another challenge to Smith would come back through the
courts, forcing the Court to decide how much free exercise protection
religions enjoy. We question how strong the Establishment Clause re-

mains. Five Justices have left abortion to the states. The Catholic Court
has been religion-friendly.

It will be interesting to see if future Catholics and non-Catholics
on the Court continue or end these positions toward religion.

